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Abstract
You put a program on a concurrent server, but you don’t trust
the server; later, you get a trace of the actual requests that
the server received from its clients and the responses that
it delivered. You separately get logs from the server; these
are untrusted. How can you use the logs to efficiently verify
that the responses were derived from running the program
on the requests? This is the Efficient Server Audit Problem,
which abstracts real-world scenarios, including running a
web application on an untrusted provider. We give a solution
based on several new techniques, including simultaneous
replay and efficient verification of concurrent executions. We
implement the solution for PHP web applications. For several
applications, our verifier achieves 5.6–10.9× speedup versus
simply re-executing, with <10% overhead for the server.
1 Motivation and contents
Dana the Deployer works for a company whose employees
use an open-source web application built from PHP and a SQL
database. The application is critical: it is a project manage-
ment tool (such as JIRA), a wiki, or a forum. For convenience
and performance, Dana wants to run the application on a
cloud platform, say AWS [1]. However, Dana has no visibil-
ity into AWS. Meanwhile, undetected corrupt execution—as
could happen from misconfiguration, errors, compromise, or
adversarial control at any layer of the execution stack: the
language run-time, the HTTP server, the OS, the hypervisor,
the hardware—would be catastrophic for Dana’s company. So
Dana would like assurance that AWS is executing the actual
application as written. How can Dana gain this assurance?
Dana’s situation is one example of a fundamental problem,
which this paper defines and studies: the Efficient Server Audit
Problem. The general shape of this problem is as follows. A
principal supplies a program to an untrusted executor that is
supposed to perform repeated and possibly concurrent execu-
tions of the program, on different inputs. The principal later
wants to verify that the outputs delivered by the executor were
produced by running the program. The verification algorithm,
or verifier, is given an accurate trace of the executor’s inputs
and delivered outputs. In addition, the executor gives the veri-
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fier reports, but these are untrusted and possibly spurious. The
verifier must somehow use the reports to determine whether
the outputs in the trace are consistent with having actually
executed the program. Furthermore, the verifier must make
this determination efficiently; it should take less work than
re-executing the program on every input in the trace.
The requirement of a trace is fundamental: if we are audit-
ing a server’s outputs, then we need to know those outputs.
Of course, getting a trace may not be feasible in all cases.
In Dana’s case, the company can place a middlebox at the
network border, to capture end-clients’ traffic to and from the
application. We discuss other scenarios later (§4.1, §7).
We emphasize that the Efficient Server Audit Problem is
separate from—but complementary to—program verification,
which is concerned with developing bug-free programs. Our
concern instead is whether a given program is actually exe-
cuted as written. Neither guarantee subsumes the other.
The high-level consideration here is execution integrity,
a topic that has been well-studied in several academic com-
munities, with diverse solutions (§6.1). The novelty in our
variant is in combining three characteristics: (1) we make no
assumptions about the failure modes of the executor, (2) we
allow the executor to be concurrent, and (3) we insist on solu-
tions that scale beyond toy programs and are compatible with
(at least some) legacy programs.
The contributions and work of this paper are as follows.
§2 Definition of the Efficient Server Audit Problem. We
first present the problem in theoretical terms. We do this
to show the generality and the fundamental challenges.
§3 An abstract solution: SSCO. We exhibit a solution at
a theoretical level, so as to highlight the core concepts,
techniques, and algorithms. These include:
§3.1 SIMD [6]-on-demand. The verifier re-executes all re-
quests, in an accelerated way. For a group of requests
with the same control flow, the verifier executes a
“superposition”: instructions with identical operands
across requests are performed once, whereas instruc-
tions with different operands are executed individually
and merged into the superposed execution. This solu-
tion assumes that the workload has repeated traversal
of similar code paths—which is at least the case for
some web applications, as observed by Poirot [53, §5].
§3.3 Simulate-and-check. How can the verifier re-execute
reads of persistent or shared state? Because it re-
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executes requests out of order, it cannot physically
re-invoke operations on such state, but neither can it
trust reports that are allegedly the originally read val-
ues (§3.2). Instead, the executor (purportedly) logs each
operation’s operands; during re-execution, the verifier
simulates reads, using the writes in the logs, and checks
the logged writes opportunistically.
§3.5 Consistent ordering. The verifier must ensure that op-
erations can be consistently ordered (§3.4). To this end,
the verifier builds a directed graph with a node for
every external observation or alleged operation, and
checks whether the graph is acyclic. This step incorpo-
rates an efficient algorithm for converting a trace into a
time precedence graph. This algorithm would acceler-
ate prior work [14, 51] and may be useful elsewhere.
SSCO has other aspects besides, and the unified whole was
difficult to get right (§7): our prior attempts had errors that
came to light when we tried to prove correctness. This
version, however, is proved correct (Appendix A).
§4 A built system: OROCHI. We describe a system that im-
plements SSCO for PHP web applications. This is for the
purpose of illustration, as we expect the system to gen-
eralize to other web languages, and the theoretical tech-
niques in SSCO to apply in other contexts (§7). OROCHI
includes a record-replay system [34, 35] for PHP [27, 53].
The replayer is a modified language runtime that imple-
ments SIMD-on-demand execution using multivalue types
that hold the program state for multiple re-executions.
OROCHI also introduces mechanisms, based on a ver-
sioned database [27, 41, 62, 81], to adapt simulate-and-
check to databases and to deduplicate database queries.
§5 Experimental evaluation of OROCHI. In experiments
with several applications, the verifier can audit 5.6–
10.9× faster than simple re-execution; this is a loose
lower bound, as the baseline is very pessimistic for
OROCHI (§5.1). OROCHI imposes overhead of roughly
10% on the web server. OROCHI’s reports, per-request,
are 3%–11% of the size of a request-response pair. Most
significantly, the verifier must keep a copy of the server’s
persistent state.
The main limitations (§5.5) are that, first, in SSCO the ex-
ecutor has discretion over scheduling concurrent requests,
and it gets additional discretion, in OROCHI, over the return
values of non-deterministic PHP built-ins. Second, OROCHI
is restricted to applications that do not interact much with
other applications; nevertheless, there are suitable application
classes, for example LAMP [3]. Third, OROCHI requires mi-
nor modifications in some applications, owing to the SSCO
model. Finally, the principal can audit an application only
after activating OROCHI; if the server was previously running,
the verifier has to bootstrap from the pre-OROCHI state.
collector
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audit phaseonline phase
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executor
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…
Figure 1—The Efficient Server Audit Problem. The objects abstract
shared state (databases, key-value stores, memory, etc.). The tech-
nical problem is to design the verifier and the reports to enable
the verifier, given a trace and a program, to efficiently validate (or
invalidate) the contents of responses.
2 Problem definition
This section defines the Efficient Server Audit Problem. The
actors and components are depicted in Figure 1.
A principal chooses or develops a program, and deploys
that program on a powerful but untrusted executor.
Clients (the outside world) issue requests (inputs) to the
executor, and receive responses (outputs). A response is sup-
posed to be the output of the program, when the correspond-
ing request is the input. But the executor is untrusted, so the
response could be anything.
A collector captures an ordered list, or trace, of requests
and responses. We assume that the collector does its job
accurately, meaning that the trace exactly records the requests
and the (possibly wrong) responses that actually flow into and
out of the executor.
The executor maintains reports whose purpose is to assist
an audit; like the responses, the reports are untrusted.
Periodically, the principal conducts an audit; we often refer
to the audit procedure as a verifier. The verifier gets a trace
(from the accurate collector) and reports (from the untrusted
executor). The verifier needs to determine whether executing
the program on each input in the trace truly produces the
respective output in the trace.
Two features of our setting makes this determination chal-
lenging. First, the verifier is much weaker than the executor,
so it cannot simply re-execute all of the requests.
The second challenge arises from concurrency: the executor
is permitted to handle multiple requests at the same time (for
example, by assigning each to a separate thread), and the in-
voked program is permitted to issue operations to objects. An
object abstracts state shared among executions, for example
a database, key-value store, or memory cells (if shared). We
will be more precise about the concurrency model later (§3.2).
For now, a key point is that, given a trace—in particular, given
the ordering of requests and responses in the trace, and given
the contents of requests—the number of valid possibilities for
the contents of responses could be immense. This is because
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an executor’s responses depend on the contents of shared
objects; as usual in concurrent systems, those contents de-
pend on the operation order, which depends on the executor’s
internal scheduling choices.
Somehow, the reports, though unreliable, will have to help
the verifier efficiently tell the difference between valid and
invalid traces. In detail, the problem is to design the verifier
and the reports to meet these properties:
• Completeness. If the executor behaved during the time
period of the trace, meaning that it executed the given
program under the appropriate concurrency model, then
the verifier must accept the given trace.
• Soundness. The verifier must reject if the executor mis-
behaved during the time period of the trace. Specifically,
the verifier accepts only if there is some schedule S, mean-
ing an interleaving or context-switching among (possibly
concurrent) executions, such that: (a) executing the given
program against the inputs in the trace, while following
S, reproduces exactly the respective outputs in the trace,
and (b) S is consistent with the ordering in the trace. (Ap-
pendix A states Soundness precisely.) This property means
that the executor can pass the audit only by executing the
program on the received requests—or by doing something
externally indistinguishable from that.
• Efficiency. The verifier must require only a small fraction
of the computational resources that would be required to re-
execute each request. Additionally, the executor’s overhead
must be only a small fraction of its usual costs to serve
requests (that is, without capturing reports). Finally, the
solution has to work for applications of reasonable scale.
We acknowledge that “small fraction” and “reasonable
scale” may seem out of place in a theoretical description. But
these characterizations are intended to capture something es-
sential about the class of admissible solutions. As an example,
there is a rich theory that studies execution integrity (§6.1),
but the solutions (besides not handling concurrency) are so far
from scaling to the kinds of servers that run real applications
that we must look for something qualitatively different.
3 A solution: SSCO
This section describes an abstract solution to the Efficient
Server Audit Problem, called SSCO (a rough abbreviation of
the key techniques). SSCO assumes that there is similarity
among the executions, in particular that there are a relatively
small number of control flow paths induced by requests (§3.1).
SSCO also assumes a certain concurrency model (§3.2).
Overview and key techniques. In SSCO, the reports are:
• Control flow groupings: For each request, the executor
records an opaque tag that purportedly identifies the control
flow of the execution; requests that induce the same control
flow are supposed to receive the same tag.
• Operation logs: For each shared object, the executor main-
tains an ordered log of all operations (across all requests).
• Operation counts: For each request execution, the executor
records the total number of object operations that it issued.
The verifier begins the audit by checking that the trace is
balanced: every response must be associated with an earlier
request, and every request must have a single response or
some information that explains why there is none (a network
reset by a client, for example). Also, the verifier checks that
every request-response pair has a unique requestID; a well-
behaved executor ensures this by labeling responses. If these
checks pass, we (and the verifier) can refer to request-response
pairs by requestID, without ambiguity.
The core of verification is as follows. The verifier re-
executes each control flow group in a batch; this happens via
SIMD [6]-on-demand execution (§3.1). During this process,
re-executed object operations don’t happen directly—they
can’t, as re-execution follows a different order from the orig-
inal (§3.2). Instead, the operation logs contain a record of
reads and writes, and re-execution follows a discipline that
we call simulate-and-check (§3.3): re-executed read opera-
tions are fed (or simulated) based on the most recent write
entry in the logs, and the verifier checks logged write oper-
ations opportunistically. In our context, simulate-and-check
makes sense only if alleged operations can be ordered consis-
tent with observed requests and responses (§3.4); the verifier
determines whether this is so using a technique that we call
consistent ordering verification (§3.5).
At the end, the verifier compares each request’s produced
output to the request’s output in the trace, and accepts if and
only if all of them match, across all control flow groups.
The full audit logic is described in Figures 3, 5, and 6, and
proved correct in Appendix A.
3.1 SIMD-on-demand execution
We assume here that requests do not interact with shared
objects; we remove that assumption in Section 3.2. (As we
have just done, we will sometimes use “request” as shorthand
for “the execution of the program when that request is input.”)
The idea in SIMD-on-demand execution is that, for each
control flow group, the verifier conducts a single “superposed”
execution that logically executes all requests in that group
together, at the same time. Instructions whose operands are
different across the separate logical executions are performed
separately (we call this multivalent execution of an instruc-
tion), whereas an instruction executes only once (univalently)
if its operands are identical across the executions. The concept
is depicted in Figure 2.
The control flow groupings are structured as a map C from
opaque tag to set-of-requestIDs. Of course, the map is part of
the untrusted report, so the verifier does not trust it. However,
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Figure 2—Abstract depiction of SIMD-on-demand, for a simple
computation. Rectangles represent program variables, circles rep-
resent instructions. On the right, thick lines represent explicitly
materialized outputs; thin lines represent collapsed outputs.
if the map is incorrect (meaning, two requests in the same
control flow group diverge under re-execution), then the veri-
fier rejects. Furthermore, if the map is incomplete (meaning,
not including particular requestIDs), then the re-generated
responses will not match the outputs in the trace. The verifier
can filter out duplicates, but it does not have to do so, since
re-execution is idempotent (even with shared objects, below).
Observe that this approach meets the verifier’s efficiency
requirement (§2), if (1) the number of control paths taken
is much smaller than the number of requests in the audit,
(2) most instructions in a control flow group execute univa-
lently, and (3) it is inexpensive to switch between multivalent
and univalent execution, and to decide which to perform. (We
say “if” and not “only if” because there may be platforms
where, for example, condition (1) alone is sufficient.)
System preview. The first two conditions hold in the setting
for our built system, OROCHI (§4): LAMP web applications.
Condition (1) holds because these applications are in a sense
routine (they do similar things for different users) and because
the programming language is high-level (for example, string
operations or calls like sort() or max() induce the same control
flow [53]). Condition (2) holds because the logical outputs
have a lot of overlap: different users wind up seeing similar-
looking web pages, which implies that the computations that
produce these web pages include identical data flows. This
commonality was previously observed by Poirot [53], and
our experiments confirm it (§5.2). Condition (3) is achieved,
in OROCHI, by augmenting the language run-time with mul-
tivalue versions of basic datatypes, which encapsulate the
different values of a given operand in the separate executions.
Re-execution moves dynamically between a vector, or SIMD,
mode (which operates on multivalues) and a scalar mode
(which operates on normal program variables).
3.2 Confronting concurrency and shared objects
As noted earlier, a key question is: how does the verifier re-
execute an operation that reads from a shared object? An
approach taken elsewhere [27, 53] is to record the values that
had been read by each request, and then to supply those values
during re-execution. One might guess that, were we to apply
this approach to our context where reports are untrusted, the
worst thing that could happen is that the verifier would fail to
reproduce the observed outputs in the trace—in other words,
the executor would be incriminating itself. But the problem is
much worse than that: the reported values and the responses
could both be bogus. As a result, if the verifier’s re-execution
dutifully incorporated the purported read values, it could end
up reproducing, and thereby validating, a spurious response
from a misbehaved executor; this violates Soundness (§2).
Presentation plan. Below, we define the concurrency model
and object semantics, as necessary context. We then cover the
core object-handling mechanisms (§3.3–§3.5). However, that
description will be incomplete, in two ways. First, we will not
cover every check or justify each line of the algorithms. Sec-
ond, although we will show with reference to examples why
certain alternatives fail, that will be intuition and motivation,
only; correctness, meaning Completeness and Soundness (§2),
is actually established end-to-end, with a chain of logic that
does not enumerate or reason about all the ways in which
reports and responses could be invalid (Appendix A).
Concurrency model and object semantics. In a well-
behaved executor, each request induces the creation of a sepa-
rate thread that is destroyed after the corresponding response
is delivered. A thread runs concurrently with the threads of
any other requests whose responses have not yet been deliv-
ered. Each thread sequentially performs instructions against
an isolated execution context: registers and local memory.
As stated earlier, threads perform operations on shared ob-
jects (§2). These operations are blocking, and the objects
expose atomic semantics. We assume for simplicity in this
section that objects expose a read-write interface; they are
thus atomic registers [55]. Later, we will permit more com-
plex interfaces, such as SQL transactions (§4.4).
3.3 Simulate-and-check
The reports in SSCO include the (alleged) operations them-
selves, in terms of their operands. Below, we describe the
format and how the verifier uses these operation logs.
Operation log contents. Each shared object is labeled with
an index i. The operation log for object i is denoted OLi, and
it has the following form (N+ denotes the set {1, 2, . . .}):
OLi : N+ → (requestID, opnum, optype, opcontents).
The opnum is per-requestID; a correct executor tracks and
increments it as requestID executes. An operation is thus
4
Input Trace Tr Input Reports R Global OpMap : (requestID, opnum)→ (i, seqnum)
Components of the reports R:
C : CtlFlowTag → Set(requestIDs) // purported groups; §3.1
OLi : N+ → (requestID, opnum, optype, opcontents) // purported op logs; §3.3
M : requestID → N // purported op counts; §3.3
1: procedure SSCO_AUDIT()
2: // Partially validate reports (§3.5) and construct OpMap
3: ProcessOpReports() // defined in Figure 5
4:
5: return ReExec() // line 24
6:
7: procedure CHECKOP(rid, opnum, i, optype, opcontents)
8: if (rid, opnum) not in OpMap: REJECT
9:
10: iˆ, s ← OpMap[rid, opnum]
11: oˆt, oˆc ← (OLi[s].optype, OLi[s].opcontents)
12: if i ̸= iˆ or optype ̸= oˆt or opcontents ̸= oˆc:
13: REJECT
14: return s
15:
16: procedure SIMOP(i, s, optype, opcontents)
17: ret ← ⊥
18: writeop ← walk backward in OLi from s; stop when
19: optype=RegisterWrite
20: if writeop doesn’t exist:
21: REJECT
22: ret = writeop.opcontents
23: return ret
24: procedure REEXEC()
25: Re-execute Tr in groups according to C:
26:
27: (1) Initialize a group as follows:
28: Read in inputs for all requests in the group
29: Allocate program structures for each request in the group
30: opnum ← 1 // opnum is a per-group running counter
31:
32: (2) During SIMD-on-demand execution (§3.1):
33:
34: if execution within the group diverges: return REJECT
35:
36: When the group makes a state operation:
37: optype ← the type of state operation
38: for all rid in the group:
39: i, oc ← state op parameters from execution
40: s ← CheckOp(rid, opnum, i, optype, oc) // line 7
41: if optype = RegisterRead:
42: state op result← SimOp(i, s, optype, oc) // line 16
43: opnum ← opnum + 1
44:
45: (3) When a request rid finishes:
46: if opnum < M(rid): return REJECT
47:
48: (4) Write out the produced outputs
49:
50: if the produced outputs from (4) are exactly the responses in Tr:
51: return ACCEPT
52: return REJECT
Figure 3—The SSCO audit procedure. The supplied trace Tr must be balanced (§3), which the verifier ensures before invoking SSCO_AUDIT.
A rigorous proof of correctness is in Appendix A.
identified with a unique (rid, opnum) pair. The optype and
opcontents depend on the object type. For registers, optype
can be RegisterRead (and opcontents are supposed to be
empty) or RegisterWrite (and opcontents is the value to
write).
What the verifier does. The core re-execution logic is con-
tained in ReExec (Figure 3, line 24). The verifier feeds re-
executed reads by identifying the latest write before that
read in the log. Of course, the logs might be spurious, so for
write operations, the verifier opportunistically checks that the
operands (produced by re-execution) match the log entries.
In more detail, when re-executing an operation
(rid, opnum), the verifier uses OpMap (as defined in
Fig. 3) to identify the log entry; it then checks that the
parameters (generated by program logic) match the logs.
Specifically, the verifier checks that the targeted object
corresponds to the (unique) log that holds (rid, opnum)
(uniqueness is ensured by checks in Figure 5), and that the
produced operands (such as the value to be written) are the
same as in the given log entry (lines 37–40, Figure 3). If
the re-executed operation is a read, the verifier feeds it by
identifying the write that precedes (rid, opnum); this is done
in SimOp.
Notice that an operation that reads a given write might
re-execute long before the write is validated. The intuition
here is that a read’s validity is contingent on the validity of
all prior write operations in the log. Meanwhile, the audit
procedure succeeds only if all checks—including the ones of
write operations—succeed, thereby retroactively discharging
the assumption underlying every read.
What prevents the executor from justifying a spurious re-
sponse by inserting into the logs additional operations? Vari-
ous checks in the algorithm would detect this and other cases.
For example, the op count reports M enforce certain invari-
ants, and interlocking checks in the algorithms validate M.
3.4 Simulate-and-check is not enough
To show why simulate-and-check is insufficient by itself, and
to illustrate the challenge of augmenting it, this section walks
through several simple examples. This will give intuition for
the techniques in the next section (§3.5).
The examples are depicted in Figure 4 and denoted a, b,
c. Each of them involves two requests, r1 and r2. Each ex-
ample consists of a particular trace—or, equivalently, a par-
ticular request-response pattern—and particular reports. As
a shorthand, we notate the delivered responses with a pair
(r1resp, r2resp); for example, the responses in a are (1, 0).
A correct verifier must reject a, reject b, and accept c.
To see why, note that in a, the executor delivers a response
to r1 before r2 arrives. So the executor must have executed r1
5
f(){
  …………………………
  …………………………
  write(A,1)
  …………………………
  …………………………
  read(B) ! x
  …………………………
  output(x)
}
g(){
  …………………………
  write(B,1)
  …………………………
  …………………………
  read(A) ! y
  …………………………
  …………………………
  …………………………
  output(y)
}
r1 OLA
r2
read
r1
write 1
 
…
OLB
r2 
write 1
r1
read
 
…
OLA
r2
read
r1
write 1
 
…
OLB
r1
read
r2
write 1
 
…
OLA
r1
write 1
r2
read
 
…
OLB
r2
write 1
r1
read
 
…
r2
a
b
c
r1 req
r1: 1
r2 req
r2: 0
executor
r1 req
r1: 0
r2 req
r2: 0
executor
r1 req
r1: 1
r2 req
r2: 1
executor
Figure 4—Three examples to highlight the verifier’s challenge and to motivate consistent ordering verification (§3.5). As explained in the text,
a correct verifier (meaning Complete and Sound; §2) must reject examples a and b, and accept c. In these examples, r1 and r2 are requestIDs in
different control flow groups, and their executions invoke different subroutines of the given program. For simplicity, there is only one request
per control flow group, and objects are assumed to be initialized to 0. What varies among examples are the timing of requests and responses,
the contents of the executor’s responses, and the alleged operation logs for objects A and B (denoted OLA, OLB). The opnum component of the
log entries is not depicted.
and then executed r2. Under that schedule, there is no way to
produce the observed output (1, 0); in fact, the only output
consistent with the observed events is (0, 1). Thus, accepting
a would violate Soundness (§2).
In b, r1 and r2 are concurrent. A well-behaved executor
can deliver any of (0, 1), (1, 0), or (1, 1), depending on the
schedule that it chooses. Yet, the executor delivered (0, 0),
which is consistent with no schedule. So accepting b would
also violate Soundness.
In c, r1 and r2 are again concurrent. This time, the executor
delivered (1, 1), which a well-behaved executor can produce,
by executing the two writes before either read. Therefore,
rejecting c would violate Completeness (§2).
Now, if the verifier used only simulate-and-check (Fig-
ure 3), the verifier would accept in all three of the examples.
We encourage curious readers to convince themselves of this
behavior by inspecting the verifier’s logic and the examples.
Something to note is that in a and b, the operation logs and
responses are both spurious, but they are arranged to be con-
sistent with each other.
Below are some strawman attempts to augment simulate-
and-check, by analyzing all operation logs prior to re-
execution.
• What if the verifier (i) creates a global order O of requests
that is consistent with the real-time order (in a, r1 would be
prior to r2 in O; in b and c, either order is acceptable), and
(ii) for each log, checks that the order of its operations is
consistent with O? This would rightly reject a (r1 is before
r2 in O but not in the logs), rightly reject b (regardless of
the choice of O, one of the two logs will violate it), and
wrongly reject c (for the same reason it would reject b).
This approach would be tantamount to insisting that entire
requests execute atomically (or transactionally)—which is
contrary to the concurrency model.
• What if the verifier creates only a partial order O′ on re-
quests that is consistent with the real-time order, and then
insists that, for each log, the order of operations is consis-
tent with O′? That is, operations from concurrent requests
can interleave in the logs. This would rightly reject a and
rightly accept c. But it would wrongly accept b.
• Now notice that the operations in b cannot be ordered: con-
sidering log and program order, the operations form a cycle,
depicted in Figure 4. So what if the verifier (a) creates a
directed graph whose nodes are all operations in the log
and whose edges are given by log order and program order,
and (b) checks that there are no cycles? That would rightly
reject b and accept c. But it would wrongly accept a.
The verifier’s remaining techniques, described next, can be
understood as combining the preceding failed attempts.
3.5 Consistent ordering verification
At a high level, the verifier ensures the existence of an implied
schedule that is consistent with external observations and
alleged operations. Prior to re-executing, the verifier builds
a directed graph G with a node for every event (an observed
request or response, or an alleged operation); edges represent
precedence [55]. The verifier checks whether G is acyclic.
If so, then all events can be consistently ordered, and the
implied schedule is exactly the ordering implied by G’s edges.
Note, however, that the verifier does not follow that order
when re-executing nor does the verifier consult G again.
Figures 5 and 6 depict the algorithms. G contains nodes
labeled (rid, opnum), one for each alleged operation in the
logs. G also contains, for each request rid in the trace, nodes
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1: Global Trace Tr, Reports R, Graph G, OpMap OpMap
2: procedure PROCESSOPREPORTS()
3:
4: GTr ← CreateTimePrecedenceGraph() // defined in Figure 6
5: SplitNodes(GTr)
6: AddProgramEdges()
7:
8: CheckLogs() // also builds the OpMap
9: AddStateEdges()
10:
11: if CycleDetect(G): // standard algorithm; see [32, Ch. 22]
12: REJECT
13:
14: procedure SPLITNODES(Graph GTr)
15: G.Nodes ← {}, G.Edges ← {}
16: for each node rid ∈ GTr.Nodes:
17: G.Nodes += { (rid, 0), (rid,∞) }
18: for each edge ⟨rid1, rid2⟩ ∈ GTr.Edges:
19: G.Edges += ⟨(rid1,∞), (rid2, 0)⟩
20:
21: procedure ADDPROGRAMEDGES()
22: for all rid that appear in the events in Tr:
23: for opnum = 1, . . . , R.M(rid):
24: G.Nodes += (rid, opnum)
25: G.Edges += ⟨(rid, opnum− 1), (rid, opnum)⟩
26: G.Edges += ⟨(rid, R.M(rid)), (rid,∞)⟩
27:
28: procedure CHECKLOGS()
29: for log = R.OL1, . . . , R.OLn:
30: for j = 1, . . . , length(log):
31: if log[j].rid does not appear in Tr or
32: log[j].opnum ≤ 0 or
33: log[j].opnum > R.M(log[j].rid) or
34: (log[j].rid, log[j].opnum) is in OpMap:
35: REJECT
36:
37: let curr_op = (log[j].rid, log[j].opnum)
38: OpMap[curr_op]← (i, j) // i is the index such that log = R.OLi
39:
40: for all rid that appear in the events in Tr:
41: for opnum = 1, . . . , R.M(rid):
42: if (rid, opnum) is not in OpMap: REJECT
43:
44: procedure ADDSTATEEDGES()
45: // Add edge to G if adjacent log entries are from different
46: // requests. If they are from the same request, check that the
47: // intra-request opnum increases
48: for log = R.OL1, . . . , R.OLn:
49: for j = 2, . . . , length(log):
50: let curr_r, curr_op, prev_r, prev_op =
51: (log[j].rid, log[j].opnum, log[j−1].rid, log[j−1].opnum)
52: if prev_r ̸= curr_r:
53: G.Edges += ⟨(prev_r, prev_op), (curr_r, curr_op)⟩
54: else if prev_op > curr_op: REJECT
Figure 5—ProcessOpReports ensures that events (request arrival,
departure of response, and operations) can be consistently ordered. It
does this by constructing a graph G—the nodes are events; the edges
reflect request precedence in Tr, program order, and the operation
logs—and ensuring that G has no cycles. OpMap is constructed here
as an index of the operation logs.
1: procedure CREATETIMEPRECEDENCEGRAPH()
2: // “Latest” requests; “parent(s)” of any new request
3: Frontier ← {}
4: GTr.Nodes ← {}, GTr.Edges ← {}
5:
6: for each input and output event in Tr, in time order:
7: if the event is REQUEST(rid):
8: GTr.Nodes += rid
9: for each r in Frontier:
10: GTr.Edges += ⟨r, rid⟩
11: if the event is RESPONSE(rid):
12: // rid enters Frontier, evicting its parents
13: Frontier −= { r | ⟨r, rid⟩ ∈ GTr.Edges }
14: Frontier += rid
15: return GTr
Figure 6—Algorithm for explicitly materializing the time-
precedence partial order, <Tr, in a graph. The algorithm constructs
GTr so that r1 <Tr r2 ⇐⇒ GTr has a directed path from r1 to r2. Tr
is assumed to be a (balanced; §3) list of REQUEST and RESPONSE
events in time order.
(rid, 0) and (rid,∞), representing the arrival of the request
and the departure of the response, respectively. The edges in
G capture program order via AddProgramEdges and alleged
operation order via AddStateEdges.
Capturing time precedence. To be consistent with external
observations, G must also capture time precedence. (This is
what was missing in the final attempt in §3.4.) We say that r1
precedes r2 (notated r1 <Tr r2) if the trace Tr shows that r1
departed from the system before r2 arrived [55]. If r1 <Tr r2,
then the operations issued by r1 must occur in the implied
schedule prior to those issued by r2.
Therefore, the verifier needs to construct edges that capture
the <Tr partial order, in the sense that r1 <Tr r2 ⇐⇒ G has
a directed path from (r1,∞) to (r2, 0). How can the verifier
construct these edges from the trace? Prior work [14] gives
an offline algorithm for this problem that runs in time O(X ·
log X + Z), where X is the number of requests, and Z is the
minimum number of time-precedence edges needed (perhaps
counter-intuitively, more concurrency leads to higher Z).
By contrast, our solution runs in time O(X + Z) (§A.8),
and works in streaming fashion. The key algorithm is Create-
TimePrecedenceGraph, given in Figure 6 and proved correct
in Appendix A (Lemma 2). The algorithm tracks a “frontier”:
the set of latest, mutually concurrent requests. Every new
arrival descends from all members of the frontier. Once a
request leaves, it evicts all of its parents from the frontier.
This algorithm may be of independent interest; for example,
it could be used to accelerate prior work [14, 51].
Overall, the algorithms in Figures 5 and 6 cost O(X+Y+Z)
time and O(Y) space (§A.8), with good constants (Fig. 9;
§5.2); here, Y is the number of object operations in the logs.
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4 A built system: OROCHI
The prior two sections described the Efficient Server Audit
Problem, and how it can be solved with SSCO. This section
applies the model to an example system that we built.
Consider again Dana, who wishes to verify execution of a
SQL-backed PHP web application running on AWS. In this
context, the program is a PHP application (and the separate
PHP scripts are subroutines). The executor is the entire remote
stack, from the hardware to the hypervisor and all the way up
to and including the PHP runtime; we often call the executor
just the server. The requests and responses are the HTTP
requests and responses that flow in and out of the application.
The collector is a middlebox at the edge of Dana’s company,
and is placed to inspect and capture end-clients’ requests
and the responses that they receive. An object can be a SQL
database, per-client data that persists across requests, or other
external state accessed by the application.
We can apply SSCO to this context, if we:
• Develop a record-replay system for PHP in which replay
is batched according to SIMD-on-demand (§3.1).
• Define a set of object types that (a) abstract PHP state
constructs (session data, databases, etc.) and (b) obey the
semantics in SSCO (§3.2). Each object type requires adapt-
ing simulate-and-check (§3.3) and, possibly, modifying
the application to respect the interfaces of these objects.
• Incorporate the capture (and ideally validation) of certain
sources of non-determinism, such as PHP built-ins.
The above items represent the main work of our system,
OROCHI. We describe the details in Sections 4.3–4.7.
4.1 Applicability of OROCHI, theory vs. practice
OROCHI is relevant in scenarios besides Dana’s. As an exam-
ple, Pat the Principal runs a public-facing web application
on local hardware and is worried about compromise of the
server, but trusts a middlebox in front of the server to collect
the trace. We describe other scenarios later (§7).
OROCHI is implemented for PHP-based HTTP applications
but in principle generalizes to other web standards. Also,
OROCHI verifies an application’s interactions with its clients;
verifying communication with external services requires addi-
tional mechanism (§5.5). Ultimately, OROCHI is geared to ap-
plications with few such interactions. This is certainly restric-
tive, but there is a useful class within scope: the LAMP [3]
stack. The canonical LAMP application is a PHP front-end to
a database, for example a wiki or bug database.
The model in Sections 2 and 3 was very general and
abstracted away certain considerations that are relevant in
OROCHI’s setting. We describe these below:
Persistent objects. The verifier needs the server’s objects
as they were at the beginning of the audited period. If audit
periods are contiguous, then the verifier in OROCHI produces
the required state during the previous audit (§4.5).
Server-client collusion. In Section 2, we made no assump-
tions about the server and clients. Here, however, we assume
that the server cannot cause end-clients to issue spurious
requests; otherwise, the server might be able to “legally” in-
sert events into history. This assumption fits Dana’s situation
though is admittedly shakier in Pat’s.
Differences in stack versions. The verifier’s and server’s
stacks need not be the same. However, it is conceivable that
different versions could cause the verifier to erroneously re-
ject a well-behaved server (the inverse error does not arise:
validity is defined by the verifier’s re-execution). If the ver-
ifier wanted to eliminate this risk, it could run a stack with
precise functional equivalence to the server’s. Another option
is to obtain the server-side stack in the event of a divergent
re-execution, so as to exonerate the server if warranted.
Modifications by the network. Responses modified en route
to the collector appear to OROCHI to be the server’s responses;
modifications between the collector and end-clients—a real
concern in Pat’s scenario, given that ISPs have hosted ad-
inserting middleboxes [31, 91]—can be addressed by Web
Tripwires (WT) [70], which are complementary to OROCHI.
4.2 Some basics of PHP
PHP [5] is a high-level language. When a PHP script is run
by a web server, the components of HTTP requests are ma-
terialized as program variables. For example, if the end-user
submits http://www.site.org/s.php?a=7, then the web
server invokes a PHP runtime that executes s.php; within the
script s.php, $_GET[’a’] evaluates to 7.
The data types are primitive (int, double, bool, string);
container (arrays, objects); reference; class; resource (an
abstraction of an external resource, such as a connection
to a database system); and callables (closures, anonymous
functions, callable objects).
The PHP runtime translates each program line to byte code:
one or more virtual machine (VM) instructions, together with
their operands. (Some PHP implementations, such as HHVM,
support JIT, though OROCHI’s verifier does not support this
mode.) Besides running PHP code, the PHP VM can call
built-in functions, written in C/C++.
4.3 SIMD-on-demand execution in OROCHI
The server and verifier run modified PHP runtimes. The
server’s maintains an incremental digest for each execution.
When the program reaches a branch, this runtime updates the
digest based on the type of the branch (jump, switch, or itera-
tion) and the location to which the program jumps. The digest
thereby identifies the control flow, and the server records it.
The verifier’s PHP runtime is called acc-PHP; it performs
SIMD-on-demand execution (§3.1), as we describe below.
Acc-PHP works at the VM level, though in our examples
and description below, we will be loose and often refer to the
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original source. Acc-PHP broadens the set of PHP types to
include multivalue versions of the basic types. For example,
a multivalue int can be thought of as a vector of ints. A
container’s cells can hold multivalues; and a container can
itself be a multivalue. Analogously, a reference can name a
multivalue; and a reference can itself be a multivalue, in which
case each of the references in the vector is logically distinct.
A variable that is not a multivalue is called a univalue.
All requests in a control flow group invoke the same PHP
script s. At the beginning of re-executing a control flow group,
acc-PHP sets the input variables in s to multivalues, based on
the inputs in the trace. Roughly speaking, instructions with
univalue operands produce univalues, and instructions with
multivalue operands produce multivalues. But when acc-PHP
produces a multivalue whose components are identical, re-
flecting a variable that is the same across executions, acc-PHP
collapses it down to a univalue; this is crucial to deduplica-
tion (§5.2). A collapse is all or nothing: every multivalue has
cardinality equal to the number of requests being re-executed.
Primitive types. When the operands of an instruction or
function are primitive multivalues, acc-PHP executes that
instruction or function componentwise. Also, if there are
mixed multivalue and univalue operands, acc-PHP performs
scalar expansion (as in Matlab, etc.): it creates a multivalue,
all of whose components are equal to the original univalue.
As an example, consider:
1 $sum = $_GET[’x’] + $_GET[’y’];
2 $larger = max ($sum, $_GET[’z’]);
3 $odd = ($larger % 2) ? "True" : "False";
4 echo $odd;
r1: /prog.php?x=1&y=3&z=10
r2: /prog.php?x=2&y=4&z=10
There are two requests: r1 and r2. Each has three in-
puts: x, y, and z, which are materialized in the program as
$_GET[’x’], etc. Acc-PHP represents these inputs as mul-
tivalues: $_GET[’x’] evaluates to [1, 2], and $_GET[’y’]
evaluates to [3, 4]. In line 1, both operands of + are multival-
ues, and $sum receives the elementwise sum: [4, 6]. In line
2, $larger receives [10, 10], and acc-PHP merges the multi-
value to make it a univalue. As a result, lines 3 and 4 execute
once, rather than once for each request.
A multivalue can comprise different types. For example,
in two requests that took the same code path, a program
variable was an int in one request and a float in the other. Our
acc-PHP implementation handles an int-and-float mixture.
However, if acc-PHP encounters a different mixture, it retries,
by separately re-executing the requests in sequence.
Containers. We use the example of a “set” on an object:
$obj->$key = $val. Acc-PHP handles “gets” similarly,
and likewise other containers (arrays, arrays of arrays, etc.).
Assume first that $obj is a multivalue. If either of $key
and $val are univalues, acc-PHP performs scalar expansion
to create a multivalue for $key and $val. Then, acc-PHP
assigns the ith component of $val to the property named by
the ith component of $key in the ith object in $obj.
Now, if $obj is a univalue and $key is a multivalue,
acc-PHP expands the $obj into a multivalue, performs scalar
expansion on $val (if a univalue), and then proceeds as in the
preceding paragraph. The reason for the expansion is that in
the original executions, the objects were no longer equivalent.
When $obj and $key are univalues, and $val is a mul-
tivalue, acc-PHP assigns $val to the given object’s given
property. This is similar to the way that acc-PHP set up
$_GET[’a’] as a multivalue in the example above.
Built-in functions. For acc-PHP’s re-execution to be correct,
PHP’s built-in functions (§4.2) would need to be extended to
understand multivalues, perform scalar expansion as needed,
etc. But there are thousands of built-in functions.
To avoid modifying them all, acc-PHP does the following.
When invoking a built-in function, it checks whether any of
the arguments are multivalues (if the function is a built-in
method, it also checks whether $this is a multivalue). If so,
acc-PHP splits the multivalue argument into a set of univalues;
assume for ease of exposition that there is only one such
multivalue argument. Acc-PHP then clones the environment
(argument list, function frame); performs a deep copy of any
objects referenced by any of the arguments; and executes the
function, once for each univalue. Finally, acc-PHP returns the
separate function results as a multivalue and maintains the
object copies as multivalues. The reason for the deep copy
is that the built-in function could have modified the object
differently in the original executions.
Global variables. There are two cases to handle. First, if a
multi-invoked built-in (as above) modifies a global and if the
global is a univalue, acc-PHP dynamically expands it to a
multivalue. Second, a global can be modified by PHP code,
implicitly. For example, referencing a nonexistent property
from an object causes invocation of a PHP function, known as
a magic method [4], which could modify a global. Acc-PHP
detects this case, and expands the global into a multivalue.
4.4 Concurrency and shared objects in OROCHI
SSCO’s concurrency model (§3.2) fits PHP-based applications,
which commonly have concurrent threads, each handling
a single end-client request sequentially. OROCHI supports
several objects that obey SSCO’s required semantics (§3.2)
and that abstract key PHP programming constructs:
• Registers, with atomic semantics [55]. These work well
for modeling per-user persistent state, known as “session
data.” Specifically, PHP applications index per-user state
by browser cookie (this is the “name” of the register) and
materialize the state in a program variable. Constructing
this variable is the “read” operation; a “write” is performed
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by PHP code, or by the runtime at the end of a request.
• Key-value stores, exposing a single-key get/set interface,
with linearizable semantics [46]. This models various PHP
structures that provide shared memory to requests: the
Alternative PHP Cache (APC), etc.
• SQL databases, which support single-query statements and
multi-query transactions. To make a SQL database behave
as one atomic object, we impose two restrictions. First, the
database’s isolation level must be strict serializability [22,
63].1 Second, a multi-statement transaction cannot enclose
other object operations (such as a nested transaction).
The first DB restriction can be met by configuration, as
many DBMSes provide strict serializability as an option. How-
ever, this isolation level sacrifices some concurrency com-
pared to, say, MySQL’s default [7]. The second DB restriction
sometimes necessitates minor code changes, depending on
the application (§5.4).
To adapt simulate-and-check to an object type, OROCHI
must first collect an operation log (§3.3). To that end, some
entity (this step is untrusted) wraps relevant PHP statements,
to invoke a recording library. Second, OROCHI’s verifier needs
a mechanism for efficiently re-executing operations on the
object. We showed the solution for registers in §3.3. But that
technique would not be efficient for databases or key-value
stores: to re-execute a DB “select” query, for example, could
require going backward through the entire log.
4.5 Adapting simulate-and-check to databases
Given a database object d—OROCHI handles key-value stores
similarly—the verifier performs a versioned redo pass over
OLd at the beginning of the audit: it issues every transaction
to a versioned database [27, 41, 62, 81], setting the version
to be the sequence number in OLd. During re-execution, the
verifier handles a “write” query (UPDATE, etc.) by checking
that the program-generated SQL matches the opcontents field
in the corresponding log entry. The verifier handles “read”
queries (SELECT, etc.) by issuing the SQL to the versioned
DB, specifying the version to be the log sequence number
of the current operation. The foregoing corresponds to an
additional step in SSCO_AUDIT and further cases in SimOp
(Figure 3); the augmented algorithms are in Appendix A.
As an optimization, OROCHI applies read query deduplica-
tion. If two SELECT queries P and Q are lexically identical
and if the parts of the DB covered by P and Q do not change
between the redo of P and Q, then it suffices to issue the query
once during re-execution. To exploit this fact, the verifier, dur-
ing re-execution, clusters all queries in a control flow group
and sorts each cluster by version number. Within a cluster, it
de-duplicates queries P and Q if the tables that P and Q touch
were not modified between P’s and Q’s versions.
1Confusingly, our required atomicity is, in the context of ACID databases,
not the “A” but the kind of “I” (isolation); see Bailis [17] for an untangling.
To speed the versioned redo pass, the verifier directs update
queries to an in-memory versioned database M, which acts as
a buffer in front of the audit-time versioned database V . When
the log is fully consumed, the verifier migrates the final state
of M to V using a small number of transactions: the verifier
dumps each table in M as a single SQL update statement
that, when issued to V , reproduces the table. The migration
could also happen when M reaches a memory limit (although
we do not implement this). This would require subsequently
re-populating M by reading records from V .
4.6 Non-determinism
OROCHI includes non-determinism that is not part of the SSCO
model: non-deterministic PHP built-ins (time, getpid, etc.),
non-determinism in a database (e.g., auto increment ids), and
whether a given transaction aborts.
Replay systems commonly record non-determinism during
online execution and then, during replay, supply the recorded
information in response to a non-deterministic call (see §6.3
for references). OROCHI does this too. Specifically, OROCHI
adds a fourth report type (§3): non-deterministic information,
such as the return values of certain PHP built-in invocations.
The server collects these reports by wrapping the relevant
PHP statements (as in §4.4).
But, because reports are untrusted, OROCHI’s verifier also
checks the reported non-determinism against expected behav-
ior. For example, the verifier checks that queries about time
are monotonically increasing and that the process id is con-
stant within requests. For random numbers, the application
could seed a pseudorandom number generator, and the seed
would be the non-deterministic report, though we have not
implemented this.
Unfortunately, we cannot give rigorous guarantees about
the efficacy of these checks, as our definitions and proofs (Ap-
pendix A) do not capture this kind of non-determinism. This
is disappointing, but the issue seems fundamental, unless we
pull the semantics of PHP into our proofs. Furthermore, this
issue exists in all systems that “check” an untrusted lower
layer’s return values for validity [15, 18, 29, 47, 95].
Beyond that, the server gets discretion over the thread
schedule, which is a kind of non-determinism, albeit one that
is captured by our definitions and proofs (Appendix A). As
an example, if the web service performs a lottery, the server
could delay responding to a collection of requests, invoke the
random number library, choose which request wins, and then
arrange the reports and responses accordingly.
4.7 Implementation details
Figure 7 depicts the main components of OROCHI.
A rewrite tool performs required PHP application modifi-
cations: inserting wrappers (§4.4, §4.6), and adding hooks to
record control flow digests and maximum operation number.
Given some engineering, this rewriting can be fully automatic;
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OROCHI component Base LOC written/changed
Server PHP (§4.3) HHVM [8] 400 lines of C++
Acc-PHP (§4.3–§4.6) HHVM [8] 13k lines of C++
Record library (§4.4, §4.6) N/A 1.6k lines of PHP
DB logging (§4.4) MySQL 320 lines of C++
In-memory versioned DB (§4.5) SQLite 1.8k lines of C++
Other audit logic (§3, §4) N/A 2.5k lines of C++/PHP/Bash
Rewriting tool (§4.7) N/A 470 lines of Python, Bash
Figure 7—OROCHI’s software components.
our implementation sometimes needs manual help.
To log DB operations (§4.4), the server’s PHP runtime
passes (rid, opnum) in the comment field of a SQL query; our
code in MySQL (v5.6) assigns a unique sequence number to
the query (or transaction), necessitating minor synchroniza-
tion. Each DB connection locally logs its queries in sub-logs;
later, a stitching daemon merges these sub-logs to create the
database operation log.
OROCHI’s versioned DB implementation (§4.5) borrows
Warp’s [27] schema, and uses the same query rewriting tech-
nique (see also §6.2). We implemented OROCHI’s audit-time
key-value store as a new component (in acc-PHP) to provide
a versioned put/get interface.
Acc-PHP has several implementation limitations. One
is the limited handling of mixed types, mentioned ear-
lier (§4.3); another is that an object that points to itself (such
as $a->b->a) is not recognized as such, if the object is a mul-
tivalue. When acc-PHP encounters such cases, it re-executes
requests separately. In addition, acc-PHP runs with a maxi-
mum number of requests in a control flow group (3,000 in
our implementation); this is because the memory consumed
by larger sizes would cause thrashing and slow down re-
execution.
In OROCHI, the server must be drained prior to an audit, but
this is not fundamental; natural extensions of the algorithms
would handle prefixes or suffixes of requests’ executions.
5 Evaluation of OROCHI
This section answers the following questions:
• How do OROCHI’s verifier speedup and server overhead
compare to a baseline of simple re-execution? (§5.1)
• What are the sources of acceleration? (§5.2)
• What is the “price of verifiability”, meaning OROCHI’s
costs compared to the legacy configuration? (§5.3)
• What kinds of web applications work with OROCHI? (§5.4)
Applications and workloads. We answer the first two ques-
tions with experiments, which use three applications: Me-
diaWiki (a wiki used by Wikipedia and others), phpBB (an
open source bulletin board), and HotCRP (a conference re-
view application). These applications stress different work-
loads. Also, MediaWiki and phpBB are in common use,
and HotCRP has become a reference point for systems se-
curity publications that deal with PHP-based web applica-
tions [27, 53, 68, 69, 73, 93]. Indeed, MediaWiki and HotCRP
are the applications evaluated by Poirot [53] (§6.3). Our ex-
perimental workloads are as follows:
MediaWiki (v1.26.2). Our workload is derived from a 2007
Wikipedia trace, which we downsampled to 20,000 requests
to 200 pages, while retaining its Zipf distribution (β =
0.53) [85]. We used a 10 year-old trace because we were
unable to find something more recent; we downsampled be-
cause the original has billions of requests to millions of pages,
which is too large for our testbed (on the other hand, smaller
workloads produce fewer batching opportunities so are pes-
simistic to OROCHI).
phpBB (v3.2.0). On September 21, 2017, we pulled posts
created over the preceding week from a real-world phpBB
instance: CentOS [2]. We chose the most popular topic. There
were 63 posts, tens to thousands of views per post, and zero
to tens of replies per post. We assume that the ratio of page
views from registered users (who log in) to guests (who do
not) is 1:40, based on sampling reports from the forum (4–9
registered users and 200–414 guests were online). We create
83 users (the number of distinct users in the posts) to view
and reply to the posts. The workload contains 30k requests.
HotCRP. We build a workload from 269 papers, 58 review-
ers, and 820 reviews, with average review length of 3625 char-
acters; the numbers are from SIGCOMM 2009 [9, 64]. We
impose synthetic parameters: one registered author submits
one valid paper, with a number of updates distributed uni-
formly from 1 to 20; each paper gets 3 reviews; each reviewer
submits two versions of each review; and each reviewer views
100 pages. In all, there are 52k requests.
As detailed later (§5.4), we made relatively small modifica-
tions to these applications. A limitation of our investigation is
that all modeled clients use the same browser; however, our
preliminary investigation indicates that PHP control flow is
insensitive to browser details.
Setup and measurement. Our testbed comprises two ma-
chines connected to a switch. Each machine has a 3.3GHz
Intel i5-6600 (4-core) CPU with 16GB memory and a 250GB
SSD, and runs Ubuntu 14.04. One of the machines alternates
between the roles of server (running Nginx 1.4.6) and verifier;
the other generates load. We measure CPU costs from Linux’s
/proc. We measure throughput and latency at the client.
5.1 OROCHI versus the baseline
What is the baseline? We want to compare OROCHI to a
system that audits comprehensively without trusting reports.
A possibility is probabilistic proofs [21, 24, 33, 66, 76, 89],
but they cannot handle our workloads, so we would have to
estimate, and the estimates would yield outlandish speedups
for OROCHI (over 106×). Another option is untrusted full-
machine replay, as in AVM [44]. However, AVM’s imple-
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audit server CPU avg reports (per request) DB overhead
App speedup overhead request baseline OROCHI OROCHI ovhd temp permanent
MediaWiki 10.9× 4.7% 7.1KB 0.8KB 1.7KB 11.4% 1.0× 1×
phpBB 5.6× 8.6% 5.7KB 0.1KB 0.3KB 2.7% 1.7× 1×
HotCRP 6.2× 5.9% 3.2KB 0.0KB 0.4KB 10.9% 1.5× 1×
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Figure 8—OROCHI compared to simple re-execution (§5.1). Left table: “Audit speedup” is the ratio of audit-time CPU costs, assuming
(conservatively) that auditing in simple re-execution is the same cost as serving the legacy application, and (perhaps optimistically) that simple
re-execution and OROCHI are given HTTP requests and responses from the trace collector. “Server CPU overhead” is the CPU cost added by
OROCHI, conservatively assuming that the baseline imposes no server CPU costs. The reports are compressed (OROCHI’s overheads include
the CPU cost of compression/decompression; the baseline is not charged for this). “OROCHI ovhd” in those columns is the ratio of (the trace
plus OROCHI’s reports) to (the trace plus the baseline’s reports). “Temp” DB overhead refers to the ratio of the size of the on-disk versioned
DB (§4.5) to the size of a non-versioned DB. Right graph: Latency vs. server throughput for phpBB (the other two workloads are similar).
Points are 90th (bars are 50th and 99th) percentile latency for a given request rate, generated by a Poisson process. The depicted data are the
medians of their respective statistics over 5 runs.
mentation supports only single-core servers, and handling
untrusted reports and concurrency in VM replay might re-
quire research (§7).
Instead, we evaluate against a baseline that is less expensive
than both of these approaches, and hence is pessimistic to
OROCHI: the legacy application (without OROCHI), which can
be seen as a lower bound on hypothetical simple re-execution.
We capture this baseline’s audit-time CPU cost by mea-
suring the legacy server CPU costs; in reality, an audit
not designed for acceleration would likely proceed more
slowly. We assume this baseline has no server CPU over-
head; in reality, the baseline would have some overhead.
We capture the baseline’s report size with OROCHI’s non-
deterministic reports (§4.6), because record-replay systems
need non-deterministic advice; in reality, the baseline would
likely need additional reports to reconstruct the thread sched-
ule. Finally, we assume that the baseline tolerates arbitrary
database configurations (unlike OROCHI; §4.4), although we
assume that the baseline needs to reconstruct the database (as
in OROCHI).
Comparison. Figure 8 compares OROCHI to the aforemen-
tioned baseline. At a high level, OROCHI accelerates the audit
compared to the baseline (we delve into this in §5.2) but in-
troduces some server CPU cost, with some degradation in
throughput, and minor degradation in latency.
The throughput reductions are respectively 13.0%, 11.1%
and 17.8% for phpBB, MediaWiki, and HotCRP. The through-
put comparison includes the effect of requiring strict serializ-
ability (§4.4), because the baseline’s databases are configured
with MySQL’s default isolation level (repeatable read).
The report overhead depends on the frequency of object
operations (§4.4) and non-deterministic calls (§4.6). Still, the
report size is generally a small fraction of the size of the
trace, as is OROCHI’s “report overhead” versus the baseline.
OROCHI’s audit-time DB storage requirement is higher than
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Figure 9—Decomposition of audit-time CPU costs. “PHP”
(in OROCHI) is the time to perform SIMD-on-demand execu-
tion (§3.1,§4.3) and simulate-and-check (§3.3,§4.4). “DB query”
is the time spent on DB queries during re-execution (§4.5). “ProcO-
pRep” is the time to execute the logic in Figures 5 and 6. “DB redo”
is the time to reconstruct the versioned storage (§4.5). “Other” in-
cludes miscellaneous costs such as initializing inputs as multivalues,
output comparison, etc.
the baseline’s, because of versioning (§4.5), but after the audit,
OROCHI needs only the “latest” state.
5.2 A closer look at acceleration
Figure 9 decomposes the audit-time CPU costs. The “DB
query” portion illustrates query deduplication (§4.5). Without
this technique, every DB operation would have to be re-issued
during re-execution. (OROCHI’s verifier re-issues every regis-
ter and key-value operation, but these are inexpensive.) Query
deduplication is more effective when the workload is read-
dominated, as in our MediaWiki experiment.
We now investigate the sources of PHP acceleration; we
wish to know the costs and benefits of univalent and mul-
tivalent instructions (§3.1, §4.3). We divide the 100+ PHP
byte code instructions into 10 categories (arithmetic, con-
tainer, control flow, etc.); choose category representatives;
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Figure 10—Cost of various instructions in unmodified PHP and
acc-PHP (§4.3). Execution times are normalized clusterwise to un-
modified PHP, for which the absolute time is given (in µs). See text
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and run a microbenchmark that performs 107 invocations
of the instruction and computes the average cost. We run
each microbenchmark against unmodified PHP, acc-PHP with
univalent instructions, and acc-PHP with multivalent instruc-
tions; we decompose the latter into marginal cost (the cost of
an additional request in the group) and fixed cost (the cost if
acc-PHP were maintaining a multivalue with zero requests).
Figure 10 depicts the results. The fixed cost of multiva-
lent instructions is high, and the marginal cost is sometimes
worse than the unmodified baseline. In general, multivalent
execution is worse than simply executing the instruction n
times!2 So how does OROCHI accelerate? We hypothesize
that (i) many requests share control flow, and (ii) within a
shared control flow group, the vast majority of instructions are
executed univalently. If this holds, then the gain of SIMD-on-
demand execution comes not from the “SIMD” part but rather
from the “on demand” part: the opportunistic collapsing of
multivalues enables a lot of deduplication.
To confirm the hypothesis, we analyze all of the control
flow groups in our workloads. Each group c is assigned a triple
(nc,αc, ℓc), where nc is the number of requests in the group,
αc is the proportion of univalent instructions in that group,
and ℓc is the number of instructions in the group. (Note that if
nc = 1, then αc = 1.0.) Figure 11 depicts these triples for the
MediaWiki workload. There are many groups with high nc,
and most groups have very high αc (the same holds for the
other two workloads), confirming our hypothesis. Something
else to note is a slight negative correlation between nc and αc
within a workload, which is not ideal for OROCHI.
5.3 The price of verifiability
We now take stock of OROCHI’s total overhead by comparing
OROCHI to the legacy configuration. OROCHI introduces a
2One might wonder: would it be better to batch by control flow and identical
inputs? No; that approach still produces multivalent executions because of
shared object reads and non-determinism, and the batch sizes are smaller.
Figure 11—Characteristics of control flow groups in the MediaWiki
workload. Each bubble is a control flow group; the center of a bubble
gives the group’s n (number of requests in the group) and α (propor-
tion of univalent instructions); the size of a bubble is proportional to
ℓ (number of instructions in the group). This workload has 527 total
groups (bubbles), 237 groups with n > 1, and 200 unique URLs.
All groups have α > 0.95; only the occupied portion of the x-axis is
depicted.
modest cost to the server: 4.7%–8.6% CPU overhead (Fig-
ure 8) and temporary storage for trace and reports. But the
main price of verifiability is the verifier’s resources:
CPU. Since the verifier’s audit-time CPU costs are between
1/5.6 and 1/10.9 those of the server’s costs (per §5.1, Figure 8),
OROCHI requires that the verifier have 9.1%–18.0% of the
CPU capacity that the server does.
Storage. The verifier has to store the database between
audits, so the verifier effectively maintains a copy of the
database. During the audit, the verifier also stores the trace,
reports, and additional DB state (the versioning information).
Network. The verifier receives the trace and reports over the
network. Note that in the Dana (§1) and Pat (§4.1) scenarios,
the principal is already paying (on behalf of clients or the
server, respectively) to send requests and responses over the
wide area network—which likely swamps the cost of sending
the same data to the verifier over a local network.
5.4 Compatibility
We performed an informal survey of popular PHP applications
to understand the effect of OROCHI’s two major compatibility
restrictions: the non-verification of interactions with other
applications (§4.1) and the non-nesting of object operations
inside DB transactions (§4.4).
We sorted GitHub Trending by stars in decreasing order,
filtered for PHP applications (filtering out projects that are
libraries or plugins), and chose the top 10: Wordpress, Pi-
wik, Cachet, October, Paperwork, Magento2, Pagekit, Ly-
chee, Opencart, and Drupal. We inspected the code (and its
configuration and documentation), ran it, and logged object
operations. For eight of them, the sole external service is
email; the other two (Magento2 and Opencart) additionally
interact with a payment server. Also, all but Drupal and Octo-
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ber are consistent with the DB requirement.
This study does not imply that OROCHI runs with these
applications out of the box. It generally takes some adjustment
to fit an application to OROCHI, as we outline below.
MediaWiki does not obey the DB requirement. We modi-
fied it so that requests read in the relevant APC keys (which
we obtain through static inspection plus a dynamic list of
needed keys, itself stored in the APC), execute against a local
cache of those keys, and flush them back to the APC. This
gives up some consistency in the APC, but MediaWiki any-
way assumes that the APC is providing loose consistency. We
made several other minor modifications to MediaWiki; for
example, changing an absolute path (stored in the database)
to a relative one. In all, we modified 346 lines of MediaWiki
(of 410k total and 74k invoked in our experiments).
We also modified phpBB (270 lines, of 300k total and 44k
invoked), to address a SQL parsing difference between the
actual database (§4.4) and the in-memory one (§4.5) and to
create more audit-time acceleration opportunities (by reduc-
ing the frequency of updates to login times and page view
counters). We modify HotCRP (67 lines, of 53k total and
37k invoked), mainly to rewrite select * from queries to
request individual columns; the original would fetch the be-
gin/end timestamp columns in the versioned DB (§4.5, §4.7).
5.5 Discussion and limitations of OROCHI
Below we summarize OROCHI and discuss its limitations.
Guarantees. OROCHI is based on SSCO, which has prov-
able properties. However, OROCHI does not provide SSCO’s
idealized Soundness guarantee (§2), because of the leeway
discussed earlier (§4.6). And observable differences in the
verifier’s and server’s stacks (§4.1) would make OROCHI fall
short of SSCO’s idealized Completeness guarantee.
Performance and price. Relative to a pessimistic baseline,
OROCHI’s verifier accelerates by factors between 5.6–10.9×
in our experiments, and server overhead is below 10% (§5.1).
The CPU costs introduced by OROCHI are small, compared to
what one sometimes sees in secure systems research; one rea-
son is that OROCHI is not based on cryptography. And while
the biggest percentage cost for the verifier is storage (because
the verifier has to duplicate it; §5.3), storage is generally
inexpensive in dollar terms.
Compatibility and usability. On the one hand, OROCHI is
limited to a class of applications, as discussed (§4.1, §5.4). On
the other hand, the applications in our experiments—which
were largely chosen by following prior work (discussed early
in §5)—did not require much modification (§5.4). Best of
all, OROCHI is fully compatible with today’s infrastructure: it
works with today’s end-clients and cloud offerings as-is.
Of course, OROCHI would benefit from extensions. All
of the applications we surveyed make requests of an email
server (§5.4). We could verify those requests—but not the
email server itself; that is future work—with a modest addi-
tion to OROCHI, namely treating external requests as another
kind of response. This would require capturing the requests
themselves; that could be done, in Pat’s scenario (§4.1), by
the trace collector or, in Dana’s scenario (§1), by redirecting
email to a trusted proxy on the verifier.
Another extension is adding a file abstraction to our three
object types (§4.4). This isn’t crucial—many applications,
including five of the 10 in our survey (§5.4), can be config-
ured to use alternatives such as a key-value store—but some
deployers might prefer a file system back-end. Another ex-
tension is filtering large objects from the trace, before it is
delivered to the verifier. A possible solution is to leverage
browser support for Resource Integrity: the verifier would
check that the correct digest was supplied to the browser,
leaving the actual object check to the browser. Other future
work is HTTPS; one option is for the server to record non-
deterministic cryptographic input, and the verifier uses it to
recover the plaintext stream.
A more fundamental limitation is that if OROCHI’s verifier
does not have a trace from a period (for example, before
OROCHI was deployed on a given server), then OROCHI can
verify only by getting the pre-OROCHI collection of objects
from the server (requiring a large download) and treating
those objects as the true initial state (requiring trust).
6 Related work
6.1 Efficient execution integrity
Efficient execution integrity—giving some principal confi-
dence that an executor’s outputs are consistent with an ex-
pected program, without requiring the principal to re-execute
the program—is a broad topic. The Efficient Server Audit
Problem (§2) combines for the first time: (1) no assumptions
about the executor (though our verifier gets a trace of request-
s/responses), (2) a concurrent executor, and (3) a requirement
of scaling to real applications, including legacy ones.
A classic solution is Byzantine replication [26]; the prin-
cipal needs no verification algorithm but assumes that a
super-majority of nodes operates fault-free. Another clas-
sic technique is attestation: proving to the principal that the
executor runs the expected software. This includes TPM-
based approaches [28, 45, 59, 60, 67, 72, 75, 80] and sys-
tems [15, 18, 49, 74, 78] built on SGX hardware [50]. But
attesting to a (possibly vulnerable) stack does not guarantee
the execution integrity of the program atop that stack. Using
SGX, we can place the program in its own enclave, but it
is difficult to rigorously establish that the checks performed
by the in-enclave code on the out-enclave code [15, 18, 78]
comprehensively detect deviations from expected behavior
(though see [79]).
EVE [51] spot-checks for storage consistency violations
but assumes correct application execution. Like OROCHI (§4),
Verena [52] targets web applications; it doesn’t require a trace
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but does assume a trusted hash server. Verena’s techniques are
built on authenticated data structures with a restricted API; it
does not support general-purpose or legacy web applications.
Execution integrity has long been studied by theorists [16,
38, 39, 43, 61], and these ideas have been refined and imple-
mented [20, 33, 66, 76] (see [89] for a survey and [13, 19, 88,
96] for recent developments). This theory makes no assump-
tions about the executor or the workload. But it doesn’t handle
a concurrent executor. Also, because these works generally
represent programs as static circuits in which state operations
exhaust a very limited “gate budget”, and because the execu-
tor’s overhead is generally at least six orders of magnitude,
they are for now unsuited to legacy web applications.
6.2 Related techniques
Computation deduplication. Delta execution [84] validates
patches in C programs by running the patched and unpatched
code together; it attempts to execute only the deltas, using
copy-on-write fork and merging. In incremental computation
(see data-triggered threads [83], iThreads [23], UNIC [82],
and citations therein), a program runs once and, when the
input changes, only the dependent parts rerun. In contrast,
SIMD-on-demand (§3.1) works at a higher level of abstrac-
tion; this exposes deduplication opportunities [53] and allows
the verifier and executor to run separate implementations of
the same logical program (§7). Also, SIMD-on-demand re-
executes multiple requests simultaneously, which composes
easily with query deduplication (§4.5).
Consistency testing. Anderson et al. [14] give an algo-
rithm that checks whether a trace of operations on a key-value
store obeys register semantics [55]; the algorithm builds a
graph with time and precedence edges, and checks whether it
is acyclic. (See EVE [51] for a related algorithm, and Gibbons-
Korach [40] and others [42, 90] for consistency testing in gen-
eral; see also [10, 11, 77] for related algorithms that analyze
programs for memory consistency.) The time edges and cycle
detection in SSCO (Fig. 5) are reminiscent of Anderson et al.;
however, SSCO captures time edges more efficiently, as noted
in §3.5. More significantly, SSCO solves a different problem:
it validates whether a request trace meets complex applica-
tion semantics (requests are permitted to be intermingled and
invoke multiple operations), and reports are untrusted.
Time travel databases. As noted (§4.7), OROCHI’s ver-
sioned DB borrows from Warp [27] (see also [41, 62, 81]).
However, OROCHI constructs that DB only during audit,
which enables the techniques in §4.5. Also, OROCHI handles
multi-statement transactions, which Warp does not imple-
ment.
6.3 Deterministic record-replay
Record-replay is a mature field [34, 35]. SSCO (with OROCHI
as an instantiation) is the first record-replay system to achieve
the following combination: (a) the recorder is untrusted (and
the replayer has an input/output trace), (b) replay is acceler-
ated versus re-executing, and (c) there are concurrent accesses
to shared objects. We elaborate below.
Untrusted recorder. In AVM [44], an untrusted hypervisor
records alleged network I/O and non-deterministic events.
A replayer checks this log against the ground truth network
messages and then re-executes, using VM replay [25, 36].
In Ripley [87], a web server re-executes client-side code to
determine whether the output matches what the client claimed.
In both cases, the replayer does not trust the recorder, but in
neither case is re-execution accelerated.
Accelerated replay. Poirot [53] accelerates the re-execution
of web applications. OROCHI imitates Poirot: we borrow the
observation that web applications have repeated control flow
and the notion of grouping re-execution accordingly, and
we follow some of Poirot’s implementation and evaluation
choices (§4.7, §5). But there is a crucial distinction. Poirot
analyzes patches in application code; its techniques for ac-
celeration (construct templates for each claimed control flow
group) and shared objects (replay “reads”) fundamentally
trust the language runtime and all layers below [53, §2.4].
Shared objects and concurrency. We focus on solutions
that enable an offline replayer to deterministically re-execute
concurrent operations. First, the replayer can be given a thread
schedule explicitly [57, 86]. Second, the replayer can be given
information to reconstruct the thread schedule, for example
operation precedence using CREW protocols [30, 37, 54,
56, 94]. Third, the replayer can be given information to ap-
proximately reconstruct the thread schedule, for example,
synchronization precedence or sketches [12, 65, 71].3 Closest
to simulate-and-check (§3.3) is LEAP [48] (see also [92]),
which is in the second category: for each shared Java variable,
LEAP logs the sequence of thread accesses. But SSCO’s logs
also contain operands. Simulate-and-check relates to record-
replay speculation [57]: it is reminiscent of the way that the
epoch-parallel processors in DoublePlay [86] check the start-
ing conditions of optimistically executing future splices.
7 Future work and conclusion
To recap, we defined a general problem of execution integrity
for concurrent servers (§2); exhibited an abstract solution,
SSCO, based on new kinds of replay (§3); and described a
system, OROCHI, that instantiates SSCO for web applications
and runs on today’s cloud infrastructure (§4–§5).
OROCHI applies in scenarios beyond those of Dana (§1)
and Pat (§4.1). As an example, consider Adrian the AWS
User who deploys a public-facing web application. To use
OROCHI, Adrian needs a trace. Perhaps Adrian trusts AWS
to gather it (in which case Adrian’s threat model is a remote
attacker, not a cloud insider). Or perhaps AWS lets Adrian use
3DoublePlay [86] and Respec [57] use these techniques but do so online,
while searching for a thread schedule to give to an offline replayer.
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an SGX enclave, within which Adrian runs the trace collector
together with an HTTPS proxy that holds Adrian’s TLS keys;
this enforces trace collection and does not trust AWS but does
trust the attested trace collection software.
Another use case is patch-based auditing, proposed in
Poirot [53] (see also [58, 84]); here, one replays prior re-
quests against patched code to see if the responses are now
different. OROCHI can audit the effect of a patch at any layer,
not just in PHP code (as in Poirot).
An interesting aspect of SSCO is that the verifier and the
server need not run the same program—only the same logic.
For example, the executor can be a complex, replicated cloud
environment while the verifier can re-execute the logic how-
ever it wants, as long as it gets appropriate reports.
Future work is to instantiate SSCO for other web languages,
create variations of SSCO for other concurrency models, and
extend SSCO to multiple interacting servers. In addition, we
think that the techniques of SSCO have wider applicability. For
example, a direction to explore is applying query deduplica-
tion (§4.5) and simultaneous replay (§3.1) to general-purpose
or lower-level record-replay systems.
Another interesting problem is to produce a multiprocessor
record-replay system that works in a setting in which reports
are untrusted. This problem provides some intuition for our
original challenge (§2), so we conclude the paper by pointing
out why this problem is difficult.
Suppose that the offline replayer expects an explicit thread
schedule from the recorder. Then the recorder could supply
a schedule that is inconsistent with any valid execution (for
example, a schedule that ignores user-level synchronization).
By correlating bogus outputs and a bogus schedule (similar
to §3.4), the recorder could cause the replayer to reproduce
illegal executions, violating Soundness (§2). If instead the
replayer gets sparse constraints from the recorder [12, 65]
and expects to synthesize a schedule itself, this would violate
Completeness (§2): an adversarial recorder can make the re-
player search in vain for a schedule, which means the replayer
needs to bound its searching, which means that some valid
executions will be rejected for lack of search time.
The fundamental difficulty here is that concurrency
necessitates reports (for Completeness), but if the reports
are untrusted, the replayer could be misled (compromising
Soundness). Efficiency adds a further complication. This
problem—designing the reports and a procedure that vali-
dates them even as it exploits them—was more challenging
than we expected.
OROCHI’s source code is released at:
https://github.com/naizhengtan/orochi
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A Proof of Correctness
This appendix states the definition of correctness and then
proves that our audit algorithm (and associated report collec-
tion process) meets that definition. The algorithm is defined
in Section 3 and extended with additional object types in Sec-
tions 4.4–4.5. For completeness, the algorithm is included in
this appendix in Figure 12, where it is called SSCO_AUDIT2.
A.1 Definition of correctness
The two correctness properties are Completeness and Sound-
ness. We have described these properties (§2) and now make
them more precise.
Model. We presume the setting of Section 2 and the concur-
rency model of Section 3.2. We use those definitions. Addi-
tionally, in this appendix, we will sometimes use the word
“request” as a shorthand for “the execution of the program, on
input given by the request”; there are examples of this use in
the next several sentences.
Each request consists of a sequence of instructions. A spe-
cial instruction allows a request to invoke an operation on a
shared object, which we often call a state item. A request can
execute any number of such state operations over the lifetime
of request, but it can issue only one at a time. Our algorithm
handles three kinds of state items (§3.2, §4.4): atomic regis-
ters [55]; linearizable key-value stores exposing single-key
get/set operations; and strictly serializable databases, with the
restrictions stated in Section 4.4.
It will be convenient to have a notation for events (requests
and responses) in the trace. We represent such events as a
tuple:
(RESPONSE | REQUEST, rid, [contents])
A trace is a timestamped or ordered list of such tuples (the
exact timing does not matter, only the relative order of events).
We assume that traces are balanced: every response is associ-
ated to a request, and every request has exactly one response.
In practice, the verifier can ensure this property prior to be-
ginning the audit.
Definition 1 (Completeness). A report collection and audit
procedure are defined to be Complete if the following holds.
If the executor executes the program (under the model above)
and the given report collection procedure, then the given audit
procedure (applied to the resulting trace and reports) accepts.
To define Soundness in our context requires several addi-
tional notions.
Request schedule. A request schedule models the thread
context switch schedule, and is an ordered list of requestIDs.
For example:
req 1, req 23, req 1, req 14, req 5, req 1, . . .
Notice that requestIDs are permitted to repeat in the schedule.
Operationwise execution. Consider a (physically impossi-
ble) model where, instead of requests arriving and departing,
the executor has access to all requestIDs in a trace and their
inputs. Operationwise execution means executing the pro-
gram against all requestIDs by following a request schedule.
Specifically, for each request id (rid) in the request schedule,
in order:
• If it is the rid’s first appearance, the executor reads in that
request’s input and allocates the structures needed to run
the program on that input.
• Otherwise, the executor runs the request up to and including
the request’s next interaction with the outside world. This
will either be an operation on a state object, or the delivered
output (as the response).
After each such event, the request is held, until the executor
reschedules it. If a request is scheduled after it has delivered
its response, the executor immediately yields and chooses the
next rid in the request schedule.
Request precedence. A trace Tr induces a partial order
on requests. We say that a request r1 precedes another re-
quest r2 in a trace if the trace shows that (the execution of)
r1 must have ended before (the execution of) r2 began. We
notate this relation as <Tr. That is, r1 <Tr r2 if the event
(RESPONSE, r1, ·) occurs in Tr before (REQUEST, r2, ·).
Real-time consistency. A request schedule S of the kind
specified above is real-time consistent with <Tr if for any
r1, r2 that appear in S, r1 <Tr r2 =⇒ all instances of r1 in S
are sequenced before all instances of r2 in S.
Now we can define Soundness:
Definition 2 (Soundness). A report collection and audit pro-
cedure are defined to be Sound if the following holds. If the
given audit procedure accepts a trace Tr and reports R, then
there exists some request schedule, S, such that:
(a) The outputs produced by operationwise execution ac-
cording to S (on the inputs in Tr) are exactly the re-
sponses in the trace Tr, and
(b) S is real-time consistent with <Tr.
Comments on the Soundness definition. The Soundness
definition is bulky, and it may be unintuitive. But it is captur-
ing something natural: it says that a trace Tr and reports can
pass the given audit process only if the Tr is consistent with
having actually executed the requests in Tr, according to a
physical schedule at the executor.
Here is a potentially more intuitive description. The verifier
accepts only if the following holds: there exists a schedule S
such that if we feed requests to a well-behaved executor, in
the exact order that they arrived, and if the executor physically
context-switches among them according to S, then the execu-
tor will emit the precise responses that are in the trace, in the
precise order (relative to the requests and the other responses)
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that they appear in the trace.
One might wonder why do we not simply phrase the defi-
nition as, “If the audit procedure accepts, then it means that
the executor executed the program.” The reason is that mak-
ing this determination in our model is impossible: the trace
collector, and the verifier, have no visibility to look “inside”
the executor. For all they can tell, the executor is passing their
checks by doing something radically different from executing
the program. The key point, however, is that if the verifier
accepts, it means that what the executor actually did and what
it is supposed to be doing are completely indistinguishable
from outside the executor.
The definition does contain some leeway for an untrusted
executor: any physical schedule that it chooses will result in
the verifier accepting (provided the executor actually executes
the requests according to that schedule). But that leeway
seems unavoidable: in this execution and concurrency model,
even a well-behaved executor has complete discretion over
the schedule.
Model vs. proofs. Our pseudocode and proofs assume the
model stated at the outset of this section, but with one simpli-
fication. Specifically, the pseudocode and the proofs treat a
database transaction as a series of statements, with no code
interspersed (see, for example, line 27 in Figure 12). We im-
pose the simplification to avoid some tedium in the proofs.
However, the model itself reflects the implementation (§4),
which does permit code (for example, PHP) to execute in
between SQL statements that are part of the same transaction.
We address the complexity in Section A.7.
Model vs. reality. A major difference between our model
and web applications is that we are assuming that state opera-
tions and scheduling are the sole sources of non-determinism.
In reality, there is another source of non-determinism: the
return values of some functions (those that query the time,
etc.). To take this into account would complicate the defini-
tions and proofs; for example, Soundness and Operationwise
execution would need to explicitly refer to the reports that
hold the return values of non-deterministic functions (§4.6).
To avoid this complexity, our claims here ignore this source
of non-determinism.
A.2 Proof outline and preliminaries
Our objective is to prove that SSCO_AUDIT2 (Figure 12),
together with the corresponding report collection process (§3–
§4), meets Completeness (Definition 1) and Soundness (Defi-
nition 2). Below, we outline the main idea of the proof. How-
ever, this is just a rough description; the proofs themselves go
in a different order (as befits the technique).
• A central element in the proofs is a variant of
SSCO_AUDIT2 that we define, called OOOAudit (§A.4).
This variant relies on out-of-order, simulated execution,
which we call OOOExec (in contrast to ReExec2, Fig-
ure 12). OOOExec follows some supplied op schedule S
(a list of requestIDs), and executes one request at a time
up through the request’s next op (rather than the grouped
execution; §3.1). S is required to respect program order.
Thus, while requests can be arbitrarily interleaved in S,
each executes sequentially.
• We establish that OOOExec (following some schedule S)
is equivalent to ReExec2 (following some control flow re-
ports C); the argument for this is fairly natural and happens
at the end (§A.6).
The proof focuses on OOOAudit. The rough argument for
the Soundness of OOOAudit is as follows (§A.5). Assume
that OOOAudit accepts on some schedule S.
• We establish that OOOAudit is indifferent to the sched-
ule (§A.4): following S1 is equivalent to following any
other schedule S2, provided both respect program order.
• Let schedule S′ be an ordering (a topological sort) of the
graph G. An ordering exists because G has no cycles (other-
wise, OOOAudit would not have accepted S). We establish
that G, and hence S′, respects the partial order given by
externally observable events (§A.3). By the previous bullet,
OOOAudit accepts when following S′.
• We establish that this simulated execution (that is,
OOOAudit following S′) is equivalent to physical execu-
tion according to S′. The idea underlying the argument is
that the checks in the simulated execution (which pass)
ensure that the op parameters in the logs, and the ops in
the graph, match physical execution. That in turn means
that simulating certain operations (such as reads) by con-
sulting the logs produces the same result as in the physical
execution.
• Meanwhile, the final check of OOOAudit (which, again,
passes) establishes that the produced outputs (produced by
the simulated execution) equal the responses in the trace.
This bullet and the previous together imply that physical
execution according to S′ produces the responses in the
trace. Combining with the second bullet, we get that S′ is a
schedule of the kind required by the soundness definition.
The argument for Completeness of OOOAudit uses sim-
ilar reasoning to the argument for Soundness (§A.5). The
essence of the argument is as follows. If the executor operates
correctly, then (1) the reports supplied to the verifier consti-
tute a precise record of online execution, and (2) OOOAudit,
when supplied S′, reproduces that same online execution. As
a result, the contents that OOOAudit expects to see in the
reports are in fact the actual contents of the reports (both
reflect online execution). Therefore, the checks in OOOAudit
pass. That implies that OOOAudit accepts any schedule that
respects program order.
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Input Trace Tr Input Reports R Global OpMap : (requestID, opnum)→ (i, seqnum) Global kv, db // versioned storage
Components of the reports R:
C : CtlFlowTag → Set(requestIDs) // purported groups; §3.1
OLi : N+ → (requestID, opnum, optype, opcontents) // §3.3
M : requestID → N // op counts; §3.3
The form of the opcontents depends on the optype:
optype opcontents
RegisterRead empty
RegisterWrite value to write
KvGet key to read
optype opcontents
KvSet key and value to write
DBOp SQL statement(s), whether
succeeds
1: procedure SSCO_AUDIT2()
2: // Partially validate reports (§3.5) and construct OpMap
3: ProcessOpReports() // defined in Figure 5
4:
5: kv.Build(OLikv ) // OLikv is op log for versioned key-value store (§4.5)
6: db.Build(OLidb ) // OLidb is op log for versioned database (§4.5)
7:
8: return ReExec2 () // line 29
9:
10: procedure CHECKOP(rid, opnum, i, optype, opcontents)
11: if (rid, opnum) not in OpMap: REJECT
12: iˆ, s ← OpMap[rid, opnum]
13: oˆt, oˆc ← (OLi[s].optype, OLi[s].opcontents)
14: if i ̸= iˆ or optype ̸= oˆt or opcontents ̸= oˆc: REJECT
15: return s
16:
17: procedure SIMOP(i, s, optype, opcontents)
18: ret ← ⊥
19: if optype = RegisterRead:
20: writeop ← walk backward in OLi from s; stop when
21: optype=RegisterWrite
22: if writeop doesn’t exist: REJECT
23: ret = writeop.opcontents
24: else if optype = KvGet:
25: ret = kv.get(opcontents.key, s)
26: else if optype = DBOp:
27: ret = db.do_trans(opcontents.transaction, s)
28: return ret
29: procedure REEXEC2()
30: Re-execute Tr in groups according to C:
31:
32: (1) Initialize a group as follows:
33: Read in inputs for all requests in the group
34: Allocate program structures for each request in the group
35: opnum ← 1 // opnum is a per-group running counter
36:
37: (2) During SIMD-on-demand execution (§3.1):
38:
39: if execution within the group diverges: return REJECT
40:
41: When the group makes a state operation:
42: optype ← the type of state operation
43: for all rid in the group:
44: i, oc ← state op parameters from execution
45: s ← CheckOp(rid, opnum, i, optype, oc) // line 10
46: if optype ∈ {RegisterRead, KvGet, DBOp}:
47: state op result← SimOp(i, s, optype, oc) // line 17
48: opnum ← opnum + 1
49:
50: (3) When a request rid finishes:
51: if opnum < M(rid): return REJECT
52:
53: (4) Write out the produced outputs
54:
55: if the produced outputs from (4) are exactly the responses in Tr:
56: return ACCEPT
57: return REJECT
Figure 12—SSCO audit procedure. This is a refinement of Figure 3. This one includes additional objects: a versioned database and key-value
store, as used by OROCHI (§4.5). As in Figure 3, the Trace Tr is assumed to be balanced.
Conventions and notation. Per Section 3 and Figure 12, the
reports R have components C, M, OL1, . . . , OLn, where n is
the number of state items. For convenience, we will use this
notation, rather than R.M, R.OLi, etc. Note that for a DB log,
the opcontents is the SQL statement(s) in a transaction. For
example, if a DB is labeled with i = 3, then OL3[j].opcontents
contains the SQL statements in the jth DB transaction.
A ubiquitous element in the proofs is the graph G that is
constructed by ProcessOpReports. G depends on Tr and R,
but we will not notate this dependence explicitly. Likewise,
when notating directed paths in G, we leave G implicit; specif-
ically, the notation p ⇝ q means that there is directed path
from node p to node q in graph G.
A.3 Ordering requests and operations
Our first lemma performs a bit of advance housekeeping; it
relates the graph G, the Op Count reports (M), and the op-
eration log reports (OL). (The lemma is phrased in terms of
OpMap, rather than operation log reports, but in a successful
run, OpMap contains one entry for each log entry, per Fig-
ure 5, line 38.) The lemma says that, if ProcessOpReports
succeeds, then G “matches” OpMap, in the sense that every
operation label in G has an entry in OpMap, and every entry
in OpMap appears in G. This in turn means that there is a
correspondence between the nodes of G and the operations in
the logs.
Note that if ProcessOpReports succeeds, it does not mean
that G or the operation logs are “correct”; overall, they could
be nonsense. For example, M(rid) could be too big or too
small for a given rid, meaning that there are spurious or insuf-
ficient entries in the logs (and G). Or the operations of a given
rid could be in the wrong operation log (meaning that the
reports include a wrong claim about which state item a given
operation targets). Or the logged contents of a write operation
could be spurious. There are many other cases besides. All
of them will be detected during re-execution. Importantly, we
do not need to enumerate the forms of incorrectness. Rather,
we let the proofs establish end-to-end correctness.
Lemma 1 (Report consistency). If ProcessOpReports ac-
cepts, then the domain of OpMap (which is all entries in
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the log files) is exactly the set
T = {(rid, j) | rid is in the trace and 1 ≤ j ≤ M(rid)} ,
and
G.Nodes = T ∪ {(rid, 0), (rid,∞) | rid is in the trace} .
Proof. Take (rid, j) in T . By definition of T , rid is in the
trace and 1 ≤ j ≤ M(rid). The final check in CheckLogs
(which passed, per the premise) considers this element, and
ensures that it is indeed in OpMap. Now consider the domain
of OpMap. An element (rid, j) can be inserted into OpMap
(Figure 5, line 38) only if rid is in the trace, j > 0, and
j ≤ M(rid) (lines 31–33).
The second part of the lemma is immediate from the logic
in AddProgramEdges (Figure 5).
The remaining lemmas in this section establish that the
order in G is consistent with externally observable events,
as well as the claimed ordering in the operation logs. The
first step is to prove that the graph GTr produced by Create-
TimePrecedenceGraph (Figure 6) explicitly materializes the
<Tr relation. We use r1 ≺ r2 to denote that there is a directed
path from r1 to r2 in GTr.
Lemma 2 (Correctness of CreateTimePrecedenceGraph).
For all r1, r2 in Tr, r1 <Tr r2 ⇐⇒ r1 ≺ r2.
Proof. We begin with the =⇒ direction. Take r1, r2 with
r1 <Tr r2. Consider a sequence T
r1 <Tr s1 <Tr · · · <Tr sn <Tr r2
that is “tight” in that one cannot insert further elements that
obey<Tr between the members of this sequence. (At least one
such sequence must exist.) We claim that there is a directed
path:
r1 ≺ s1 ≺ · · · ≺ sn ≺ r2.
Now, if for all adjacent elements t, u in sequence T , there is
an edge ⟨t, u⟩ in GTr, then the claim holds.
Assume toward a contradiction that there are adjacent t, u
without such an edge. Then, at the time that CreateTimePrece-
denceGraph (Figure 6) processes the event (REQUEST, u, ·),
request t must have been already evicted from Frontier (if
t had not been evicted, then line 10 would have created the
edge ⟨t, u⟩). This eviction must have been caused by some
request v. But this implies that (RESPONSE, t, ·) precedes
(REQUEST, v, ·) in the trace.4 Furthermore, (RESPONSE, v, ·)
4The detailed justification is that the eviction could have happened only if
there is an edge ⟨t, v⟩ (by line 13); such an edge can exist only if t was in
the Frontier when CreateTimePrecedenceGraph processed (REQUEST, v, ·)
(by line 10); and t entered the Frontier after CreateTimePrecedenceGraph
processed (RESPONSE, t, ·) (by line 14).
precedes (REQUEST, u, ·) (because the eviction occurred be-
fore CreateTimePrecedenceGraph handled (REQUEST, u, ·)).
Summarizing, there is a request v for which:
t <Tr v <Tr u,
which contradicts the assumption that t and u were adjacent
in sequence T .
For the ⇐= direction, consider r1, r2 with r1 ≺ r2. If
r1 ̸<Tr r2, then the directed path includes an edge e = ⟨s1, s2⟩
for which s1 ̸<Tr s2; this follows from the fact that <Tr is
transitive. Now, consider the point in CreateTimePrecedence-
Graph at which e was added (line 10). At that point, s1 was in
Frontier, which implies that (RESPONSE, s1, ·) was observed
already in the scan. This implies that (RESPONSE, s1, ·) pre-
cedes (REQUEST, s2, ·) in the trace, which means s1 <Tr s2:
contradiction.
Lemma 3 (G obeys request precedence). At the end of
ProcessOpReports, r1 <Tr r2 ⇐⇒ (r1,∞)⇝ (r2, 0).
Proof. =⇒ : This follows from the proof of the prior lemma,
the application of SplitNodes (Figure 5) to GTr, and the fact
that for each si in T , (si, 0) ⇝ (si,∞) (which itself follows
from the program edges, added in Figure 5, lines 25–26).
⇐= : Consider r1, r2 with (r1,∞)⇝ (r2, 0). If r1 ̸<Tr r2,
then the directed path includes an edge e = ⟨(s1,∞), (s2, 0)⟩
for which s1 ̸<Tr s2; this follows from the fact that <Tr is
transitive. But if e is an edge in G, then ⟨s1, s2⟩ is an edge in
GTr, which implies, by application of Lemma 2, that s1 <Tr s2:
contradiction.
Lemma 4 (G obeys log precedence). If ProcessOpReports
accepts, then for all operation logs OLi,
1 ≤ j < k ≤ length(OLi) =⇒
(OLi[j].rid, OLi[j].opnum)⇝ (OLi[k].rid, OLi[k].opnum).
Proof. Fix OLi, j; induct over k. Base case: k = j + 1.
If OLi[j].rid = OLi[j+1].rid, then the check in Fig-
ure 5, line 54 and the existing program edges to-
gether ensure that (OLi[j].rid, OLi[j].opnum) ⇝
(OLi[j+1].rid, OLi[j+1].opnum). If on the other hand
OLi[j].rid ̸= OLi[j+1].rid, then line 53 in AddStateEdges
inserts an edge between the two nodes.
Inductive step: consider k + 1. Reasoning identical
to the base case gives (OLi[k].rid, OLi[k].opnum) ⇝
(OLi[k+1].rid, OLi[k+1].opnum). And the induc-
tion hypothesis gives (OLi[j].rid, OLi[j].opnum) ⇝
(OLi[k].rid, OLi[k].opnum). Combining the two paths
establishes the result.
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1: Global Trace Tr, Reports R // includes OLi
2:
3: // S is an op schedule (§A.4)
4: procedure OOOEXEC(S)
5: for each (rid, opnum) in S:
6: if opnum = 0:
7: Read in inputs from request rid in Tr
8: Allocate program structures for a thread to run rid
9:
10: else if opnum =∞: // check that the thread produces output
11: Run rid’s allocated thread until the next event.
12: If the event is a state operation or silent exit:
13: return REJECT
14: Write out the produced output
15:
16: else
17: Run rid up to, but not including the next event; if the
18: event is not a state operation, return REJECT
19:
20: i, optype, oc ← state op parameters from execution
21: s ← CheckOp(rid, opnum, i, optype, oc)
22: if optype ∈ {RegisterRead, KvGet, DBOp}:
23: state op result← SimOp(i, s, optype, oc)
24:
25: if all produced outputs exactly match the responses in Tr:
26: return ACCEPT
27: return REJECT
Figure 13—Definition of OOOExec, a variant of ReExec2 (Fig-
ure 12) that executes according to an op schedule (§A.4). A central
concept in the correctness proofs is OOOAudit, which is the same
as SSCO_AUDIT2 (Figure 12), except that ReExec2 is replaced with
OOOExec.
A.4 Op schedules and OOOAudit
A lot of the analysis in the proof is with respect to a hypo-
thetical audit procedure, which we call OOOAudit, that is a
variant of SSCO_AUDIT2. OOOAudit performs out-of-order
execution of requests but not in a grouped way (as in §3.1);
the specifics are given shortly. OOOAudit relies on an aug-
mented notion of a request schedule, defined below, in which
requests are annotated with a per-request op number (or in-
finity). These annotations are not algorithmically necessary;
they are a convenience for the proofs.
Definition 3 (Op schedule). An op schedule is a map:
S : N→ RequestId× (N ∪ {∞}).
For example,
(1, 0), (23, 0), (1, 1), (23, 1), (23, 2), (23,∞), (1, 2), . . .
Definition 4 (Well-formed op schedule). An op schedule S
is well-formed (with respect to a trace Tr and set of reports
R) if (a) S is a permutation of the nodes of the graph G
that is constructed by ProcessOpReports, and (b) S respects
program order.
Definition 5 (OOOAudit). Define a procedure
OOOAudit(Trace Tr, Reports R, OpSched S) that is the same
as SSCO_AUDIT2(Trace Tr, Reports R), except that
ReExec2() (Figure 12, line 29)
is replaced with
OOOExec(S) (Figure 13)
Lemma 5 (Equivalence of well-formed schedules). For all
op schedules S1, S2 that are well-formed (with respect to Tr
and R),
OOOAudit(Tr, R, S1) = OOOAudit(Tr, R, S2).
Proof. Consider both invocations, one with S1 and one with
S2. The schedule (S1 versus S2) does not affect OOOAudit
until the line that invokes OOOExec. So ProcessOpReports
fails in both executions, or neither. Assume that these proce-
dures succeed, so that both executions reach OOOExec. We
need to show that OOOExec(S1) = OOOExec(S2).
S1 and S2 have the same operations, because they are both
constructed from the same graph G. Meanwhile, OOOExec re-
executes each request (meaning each rid) in isolation. To see
this, notice that none of the lines of OOOExec modifies state
that is shared across requests (OpMap, kv, etc.). Therefore, the
program state (contents of PHP variables, current instruction,
etc.) of a re-executed request rid evolves deterministically
from operation to operation, and hence the handling of each
operation for each rid is deterministic. This holds regardless
of where the operations of an rid appear in an op schedule, or
how the operations are interleaved.
Now, if OOOExec(S1) accepts, then all checks pass, and all
produced outputs match the responses in the trace. The preced-
ing paragraph implies that OOOExec(S2) would encounter
the same checks (and pass them), and produce the same out-
puts. On the other hand, if OOOExec(S1) rejects, then there
was a discrepancy in one of the checks or in the produced
output. OOOExec(S2) either observes the same discrepancy,
or else it rejected earlier than this, where “early” is with ref-
erence to the sequencing in S2. Summarizing, OOOExec(S1)
and OOOExec(S2) deliver the same accept or reject decision,
as was to be shown.
A.5 Soundness and completeness of OOOAudit
Lemma 6 (OOOAudit Soundness). If there exists a well-
formed op schedule S for which OOOAudit(Tr, R, S) accepts,
then there exists a request schedule S′′ with properties (a) and
(b) from Definition 2 (Soundness).
Proof. If OOOAudit(Tr, R, S) accepts, then there are no
cycles in the graph G produced by ProcessOpReports
(OOOAudit calls into ProcessOpReports, and
ProcessOpReports—specifically lines 11–12 in Fig-
ure 5—would reject if there were a cycle). This means that G
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can be sorted topologically. Let the op schedule S′ be such
a topological sort. Define the request schedule S′′ to be the
same as S′ but with the opnum component discarded.
S′ is well-formed: it contains the operations of G, and it
respects program order because there are edges of G between
every two state operations in the same request. By Lemma 5,
OOOAudit(Tr, R, S′) returns accept.
Property (b). Observe that no (rid, opnum) appears twice
in S′; this follows from the construction of S′ and G. Thus, one
can label each (rid, opnum) in S′ with its sequence number in
S′; call that labeling Seq. Also, note that for nodes n1, n2 in G,
if n1 ⇝ n2, then Seq(n1) < Seq(n2); this is immediate from
the construction of S′ as a topological sort of G, and below
we refer to this fact as “⇝ implies <”.
Now, assume to the contrary that S′′ does not meet property
(b) in Definition 2. Then there exist r1, r2 with r1 <Tr r2 and at
least one appearance of r2 occurring in S′′ before at least one
appearance of r1. In that case, S′ must contain (r1, i), (r2, j)
such that Seq(r2, j) < Seq(r1, i). Thus, we have:
Seq(r2, j) < Seq(r1, i) [from contrary hypothesis]
≤ Seq(r1,∞) [⇝ implies <]
< Seq(r2, 0) [Lemma 3;⇝ implies <]
≤ Seq(r2, j) [⇝ implies <]
which is a contradiction.
Property (a). We establish this property by arguing, first,
that re-executing (according to the op schedule S′) is the
same as a physical (online) execution, in which the request
scheduling is given by S′. This is the longest (and most te-
dious) step in the proof of soundness. Second, we argue that
such a physical execution is equivalent to the earlier notion
of operationwise execution (§A.1). To make these arguments,
we define two variants of the audit immediately below, and
then prove the two equivalences in sub-lemmas:
Actual. Define a variant of OOOAudit(Tr, R, S) called
Actual(Trace Tr, Reports R, OpSched S). In Actual, there is a
physical state object i for each operation log OLi. Execution
in Actual proceeds identically to execution in OOOAudit, ex-
cept that state operations are concretely executed, instead of
simulated. Specifically, Actual invokes CheckOp but then, in-
stead of simulating certain operations (Figure 13, lines 22–23),
it performs all operations against the corresponding physical
state object.
Operationwise. Define Operationwise(Trace Tr, Re-
questSched RS) to be the same as Actual, except that:
(i) All checks, including CheckOp, are discarded (notice
that the signature of Operationwise does not include the
reports that would enable checks).
(ii) Operationwise is not presented with opnums (notice that
the schedule argument RS is a request schedule, not an
op schedule). Instead, Operationwise simulates opnums:
when an rid first appears in RS, Operationwise does what
Actual does when the opnum is 0 (it reads in the inputs,
allocates program structures, etc.). Subsequent appear-
ances of rid cause execution through the next operation
or the ultimate output.
Sub-lemma 6a. OOOAudit(Tr, R, S′) and Actual(Tr, R, S′)
produce the same outputs.
Proof. We will argue that every schedule step preserves pro-
gram state in the two runs. Specifically, we claim that for
each (rid, opnum), both runs have the same state at line 24
(Figure 13). We induct over the state operations in S′, turning
to the inductive step first.
Inductive step. Consider a state operation in S′; it has the
form (rid, j), where j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , M(rid)}. The induction
hypothesis is that for all entries before (rid, j) in S′, the two
runs have the same state in line 24 (Figure 13).
If j = 1, note that execution proceeds deterministically
from thread creation, so lines 20–22 execute the same in the
two runs. If j > 1, then execution of operation (rid, j − 1)
was earlier in S′ and execution of rid “left off” at line 24.
The induction hypothesis implies that, at that point, the state
in the two runs was the same. From that point, through the
current operation’s lines 20–22, execution is deterministic.
In both cases (j = 1 and j > 1), CheckOp (line 21) passes
in Actual; this is because it passes in OOOAudit (which we
know because, as established at the beginning of the proof of
the overall lemma, OOOAudit(Tr, R, S′) accepts), and Actual
and OOOAudit invoke CheckOp with the same parameters.
It remains to show that, if optype ∈
{RegisterRead, KvGet, DBOp}, then both runs read
the same value in line 23. To this end, we establish below
a correspondence between the history of operations in
Actual and OOOAudit. Let iˆ, sˆ ← OpMap[rid, j]. Because
CheckOp passes in both Actual and OOOAudit (with the
same parameters in both runs), i = iˆ, and thus both Actual
and OOOAudit will interact with the same logical object
(Actual does so via physical operations; OOOAudit consults
the corresponding log). We refer to this object as i below.
Claim. Define Q as (OLi[1], . . . , OLi [ˆs− 1]); if sˆ = 1, Q
is defined to be empty. Then Q describes the operations, in
order, that Actual issues against physical state object i, prior
to (rid, j).
Proof. We will move back and forth between referring to op-
erations by their location in a log (OLi[k]) and by (rid, opnum)
(the domain of OpMap). There is no ambiguity because
CheckLogs (Figure 5) ensures a bijection between log en-
tries and (rid, opnum) pairs.
Each of the elements of Q, meaning each
(OLi[k].rid, OLi[k].opnum), 1≤ k≤ sˆ−1, appears in S′
before the current operation (in an order that respects the log
sequence numbers 1, . . . , sˆ− 1); this follows from Lemma 4
(and the fact that S′ is a topological sort). Furthermore, in
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OOOAudit, these are the only operations in S′ (before the
current operation) that interact with OLi. To establish this,
assume to the contrary that there is an additional operation
(rid′, j′) that appears in S′ before the current operation, with
OpMap[rid′, j′] = (i, t), for some t. If t ≤ sˆ, that violates the
aforementioned bijection; if t > sˆ, that violates Lemma 4.
Now, consider the execution in Actual. If the history of
operations to the corresponding physical state object does
not match Q, then there is an operation in the relevant prefix
of S′ for which the two runs diverge. Consider the earliest
such divergence (that is, Actual and OOOAudit are tracking
each other up to this operation); call that earliest diverging
operation (rid∗, j∗).
Consider what happens when (rid∗, j∗) executes. Both
runs produce i∗, optype∗, oc∗, the state op parameters yielded
by execution (Figure 13, line 20). These three parameters
are the same across Actual and OOOExec, by application
of the induction hypothesis (again using reasoning as we
did above: for operation (rid∗, j∗ − 1), program state was
the same in line 24, etc.). Now, consider CheckOp (line 21).
Both runs obtain i′, s′ ← OpMap[rid∗, j∗], and ot′, oc′ ←
OLi∗ [s′].optype, OLi∗ [s′].opcontents (Figure 12, lines 12–13).
But CheckOp passes in OOOExec (as argued earlier), and
hence, i∗ = i′, optype∗ = ot′, oc∗ = oc′. This means that
the state operation issued by Actual corresponds precisely to
what the log dictates (same logical object, same operation
type, same parameters, etc.).
Thus, if the two runs diverge, it must be in the sequence
number. In OOOExec, (rid∗, j∗) causes operation s′ (ordi-
nally) to log OLi′ . If the operation in Actual would be oper-
ation number s∗ (ordinally) to object i′, where s∗ ̸= s′, then
there was an earlier divergence—either Actual did not issue
an operation to object i′ when OOOExec issued an opera-
tion to OLi′ , or Actual issued an operation to object i′ when
OOOExec did not issue an operation to OLi′ . But (rid∗, j∗)
was the earliest divergence, so we have a contradiction.
Now we must establish that the operations actually re-
turn the same values in Actual and OOOExec (in Figure 13,
line 23). We begin with RegisterRead. For such operations,
Actual returns the current value of the register; by regis-
ter semantics, this value is that of the most recent “write”
in time. Because Q precisely reflects the history of opera-
tions in Actual (per the Claim), this most recent write is
the RegisterWrite operation in Q with the highest log se-
quence number. The contents of this operation is precisely
what OOOAudit “reads” into program variables in SimOp
(see Figure 12, line 21). Thus, OOOAudit and Actual read
the same value into program variables (Figure 13, line 23).
Now let us consider what happens if optype is KvGet
or DBOp. OOOAudit invokes either kv.get(key, s) or
db.do_trans(transaction, s) (Figure 12, lines 25 and 27). Each
of these calls is equivalent to:
• Constructing state by replaying in sequence
OLi[1], . . . , OLi [ˆs − 1] (specifically, the opcontents
field of these log entries), and then
• Issuing the operation given by OLi [ˆs].opcontents.
This equivalence is intuitively what db and kv provide, and
we impose this equivalence as the required specification (see
§A.7 for implementation considerations). Meanwhile, by the
earlier Claim, the history of operations to object i in Actual be-
fore the current operation is OLi[1], . . . , OLi [ˆs−1]. Moreover,
the current operation in Actual is given by optype and oc (Fig-
ure 13, line 20), which respectively equal OLi [ˆs].optype and
OLi [ˆs].opcontents; this follows from the fact that CheckOp
passes for operation (rid, j) in both executions. Therefore,
Actual and OOOExec “see” equivalent histories and an equiv-
alent current operation, for the state object in question. They
therefore return the same result (Figure 13, line 23).
Base case. The first state operation in S′ has the form
(rid, 1). The reasoning proceeds identically to the inductive
step, for j = 1. Here in the base case, Q is always empty,5 but
this does not affect the logic.
Sub-lemma 6b. Execution of program logic and state
operations proceeds identically in Actual(Tr, R, S′) and
Operationwise(Tr, S′′). In particular, they produce the same
outputs.
Proof. Actual(Tr, R, S′) passes all checks, so eliminating
them does not affect the flow of execution. Furthermore, aside
from the case opnum=0, the opnum component in S′ does
not influence the flow of execution in Actual; the component
only induces checks, which aren’t run in Operationwise. For
the opnum=0 case, notice that for each rid, (rid, 0) always
appears in S′ before (rid, j), for any j > 0 or j = ∞ (this is
because S′ is a topological sort of G). Thus, the treatment by
Operationwise(Tr, S′′) of the first occurrence of rid—namely
that it is as if Actual is encountering (rid, 0)—means that
Operationwise and Actual execute this case identically.
To conclude, recall from the outset of the proof that
OOOAudit(Tr, R, S′) accepts, which implies that it produces
as outputs precisely the responses in the trace. Sub-lemmas 6a
and 6b then imply that Operationwise(Tr, S′′) produces those
outputs too. Meanwhile, Operationwise(Tr, S′′) has the pre-
cise form of operationwise execution (defined in Section A.1),
which completes the argument.
Lemma 7 (OOOAudit Completeness). If the executor exe-
cutes the given program (under the concurrency model given
earlier) and the given report collection procedure, producing
trace Tr and reports R, then for any well-formed op schedule
S, OOOAudit(Tr, R, S) accepts.
5We know that Q is empty, as follows. Let iˆ, sˆ ← OpMap[rid, 1]. If sˆ > 1,
then operation OLˆi[1] would have appeared earlier in S
′, by Lemma 4.
Therefore, sˆ = 1, which, by definition of Q, makes Q empty.
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Proof. Consider ProcessOpReports and OOOExec in turn.
Sub-lemma 7a. ProcessOpReports passes.
Proof. If the executor is well-behaved, then CheckLogs
passes; this is because a well-behaved executor correctly sets
M and places each operation in exactly one log. Under those
conditions, the checks in CheckLogs pass.
Now we need to show that CycleDetect (Figure 5, line 11)
passes, i.e., we need to show that there are no cycles. If the
executor is well-behaved, then there is a total ordering that
defines when all log entries were written in the actual online
execution; this is because entries are part of the “emissions”
from a sequentially consistent execution. Furthermore, we can
define in this total ordering “request begin” (which happens
at the instant a request begins executing) and “request end”
(which happens at the instant a request finishes executing).
Notate these events as (rid, 0) and (rid,∞), respectively. By
sequential consistency, the (rid, 0) event must precede all
other (rid, ·) events in the total ordering, and likewise (rid,∞)
must succeed all other (rid, ·) in the total ordering. Also, in
the actual execution, if one request began after another ended,
a well-behaved executor must have executed all operations
for the former after all operations for the latter, so the total
ordering respects that property too.
Now, in ProcessOpReports (Figure 5), an edge can be
added to G only in four cases (lines 53, 25, 26, and 10):
• An edge (n1, n2) can be added to indicate that operation
n1 occurred before operation n2, in the same log.
• An edge (n1, n2) can be added to indicate that operation
n1 preceded operation n2 in the same request.
• Edges for ⟨(rid, 0), (rid, 1)⟩ and ⟨(rid, m), (rid,∞)⟩ are
added, where m is the purported maximum opnum for rid.
• If an edge of the form ⟨(r1,∞), (r2, 0)⟩ is added, then r2
began after r1 ended.
Observe that in all four cases, an edge ⟨n1, n2⟩ is added to
the audit-time graph only if operation n1 preceded operation
n2 in the total ordering given by the online execution. In
other words, the graph edges are always consistent with the
total ordering. Thus, if there is a cycle n1 ⇝ · · · ⇝ n1
in G, it means that n1 preceded itself in the total ordering,
which contradicts the notion of total ordering. So there are no
cycles.
As established immediately above, G has no cycles. It can
therefore be topologically sorted.
Sub-lemma 7b. Define op schedule S′ to be a topological
sort of graph G. Then, the invocation OOOExec(S′):
(i) reproduces the program state of online execution, and
(ii) passes all checks
Proof. Induct on the sequence S′.
Base case: The first operation in S′ has no ancestors in G.
It is thus the first occurrence of its request and has the form
(rid, 0). OOOExec(S′) handles this by reading in input and
allocating program structures deterministically; this is the
same behavior as in the online execution.
Inductive step: assume that the claim holds for the first ℓ−1
operations in S′. Denote the op with sequence ℓ as (rid, j). We
reason by cases.
Case I: j = 0. Same reasoning as the base case.
Case II: j = ∞. Recall that M is the Op Count re-
port (§A.2). Consider the operation (rid, M(rid)); it appears
in S′ prior to (rid, j) and as the most recent entry for rid.
This follows from the logic in ProcessOpReports and its
callees. The induction hypothesis implies that program state
in OOOExec(S′) is identical to the original online execution
at (rid, M(rid)). This means that OOOExec(S′) will take the
same next step that the original took, in terms of state opera-
tion versus exit versus output (because the original followed
the program code, just as OOOExec(S′) is doing). Now, if
that step were something other than an output, that would
imply that M(rid) was unfaithful to the online execution, con-
tradicting the premise of a well-behaved executor. So the next
interaction is indeed an output (in both executions), meaning
that the check in OOOExec(S′) in the opnum=∞ case passes
(Figure 13, line 12). And the produced output is the same;
in other words, the output produced by OOOExec(S′) is the
same as what was produced online, which is what is in the
trace. Thus, the output sameness check passes.
Case III: j = 1. By the induction hypothesis, OOOExec(S′)
and the online execution had the same program state at
(rid, 0). This implies that OOOExec(S′) will take the same
next step that the original took (in terms of state operation
versus exit versus output). If that step is an output or exit
rather than a state operation, that would imply that the ex-
ecutor inserted a spurious operation in the logs, contradicting
the premise of a well-behaved executor. So the step is indeed
an operation (in both executions). Being well-behaved, the
executor recorded that operation as (rid, 1) in the appropriate
operation log, and this is the operation in question. Further-
more, the contents of the log entry (meaning the fields optype
and opcontents) are faithful to the execution. Because of the
determinism in passing from (rid, 0) to (rid, 1), the same pro-
gram state is reproduced during OOOExec(S′), implying that
all checks in CheckOp pass.
RegisterWrite and KvSet operations do not affect program
state. Our remaining task under this case is to show that if
the op has optype of RegisterRead, KvGet, or DBOp, then
OOOExec(S′) produces the same value that the online execu-
tion did. To this end, let (i, s) = OpMap[rid, 1], and consider
the first s−1 operations to OLi in the original execution. These
operations have been recorded as OLi[1], . . . , OLi[s− 1], be-
cause the executor, being well-behaved, is tracking operations
correctly. Thus, these log entries give the precise history to
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this state object (in the original execution) at the time of op-
eration number s. (Note that this log could be any kind of
log: register, key-value, etc.) Call the s− 1 ops collectively Q.
At this point, we can pick up the reasoning in the inductive
step of Sub-lemma 6a after the Claim, only replacing “Actual”
with “online execution”.
Case IV: 1 < j ≤ M(rid). S′ respects program order, so
we can invoke the induction hypothesis on (rid, j − 1) to
conclude that program state after executing (rid, j − 1) is
the same in OOOExec(S′) as it was when that operation was
executed online. At this point, the same reasoning as in Case
III applies, substituting (rid, j) for (rid, 1) and (rid, j− 1) for
(rid, 0).
Sub-lemmas 7a and 7b imply that OOOAudit(Tr, R, S′)
accepts. Applying Lemma 5 to S and S′ completes the
proof.
A.6 Equivalence of OOOAudit and SSCO_AUDIT2
Having established the Completeness and Soundness of
OOOAudit, it remains to connect the grouped execu-
tions (§3.1) to those of OOOAudit.
Lemma 8. Given trace Tr and reports R, if
SSCO_AUDIT2(Tr, R) accepts, then there is a well-formed op
schedule S that causes OOOAudit(Tr, R, S) to accept.
Proof. Recall that C denotes the control flow grouping within
R (§A.2). One can construct S as follows: Initialize S to empty.
Then run SSCO_AUDIT2(Tr, R) (Figure 12), and every time
SSCO_AUDIT2 begins auditing a control flow group t, add to S
entries (rid, 0) for each rid in the set C(t). Whenever a group
issues an operation (which, because the grouped execution
does not diverge, the group does together), add (rid, j) to S
for each rid in C(t), where j is the running tally of opnums.
When the requests write their output (which, again, they do
together), add (rid,∞) to S for each rid in C(t).
Claim. For each rid, the value of j in S prior to the (rid,∞)
insertion is equal to M(rid). Proof: SSCO_AUDIT2 accepted
so passes the line that checks whether a request issues at
least M(rid) operations (Figure 12, line 51), implying that
j ≥ M(rid). But (rid, j) is in OpMap (otherwise line 11 would
have rejected), and so, by Lemma 1, j ≤ M(rid). So this
Claim is established.
By the Claim, by the fact that j increments (starting from 0),
and by the fact that SSCO_AUDIT2’s acceptance implies that
all trace responses are produced (so all requests are executed),
the constructed op schedule S has all nodes from G. S also
respects program order. It is thus well-formed.
Meanwhile, executing OOOAudit(Tr, R, S) would pre-
cisely replicate what happens in SSCO_AUDIT2(Tr, R) be-
cause the only difference in execution is that the latter inter-
leaves at the instruction and operand level, which does not
affect program state; the flow and ordering is otherwise the
same. This means that program state is also the same across
the two algorithms at the time of issued operations, and hence
the produced output is the same.
The checks are also the same. There is a superficial differ-
ence in how the “end state” is handled, but observe that both
executions reject if a request rid attempts to issue more than
M(rid) operations (in that case, the corresponding operation
is not in OpMap, so CheckOp rejects, specifically line 11,
Figure 12) or if a request attempts to exit, having issued fewer
than M(rid) operations (this happens in ReExec2 with an ex-
plicit check in Figure 12, line 51, and in OOOExec because
if an operation produces output before the opnum=∞ case,
the algorithm rejects in Figure 13, lines 17–18).
Therefore, if all checks pass in SSCO_AUDIT2(Tr, R), so
do all checks in OOOAudit(Tr, R, S), and OOOAudit(Tr, R, S)
accepts.
Combining Lemma 8 with Lemma 6, we obtain
SSCO_AUDIT2’s soundness:
Theorem 9 (SSCO_AUDIT2 soundness). Given trace Tr and
reports R, if SSCO_AUDIT2(Tr, R) accepts, then there exists a
request schedule with properties (a) and (b) from Definition 2
(Soundness).
Theorem 10 (SSCO_AUDIT2 completeness). If the executor
executes the given program (under the concurrency model
given earlier) and the given report collection procedure, pro-
ducing trace Tr and reports R, then SSCO_AUDIT2(Tr, R)
accepts.
Proof. Use C (the control flow grouping reports) to construct
the following op schedule S: take each control flow group
that SSCO_AUDIT2 would execute, and insert each request’s
operations in layers: first all of the opnum=0 entries appear
for each rid in the control flow group, then all of the opnum=1
entries, etc., up through M(rid) for each rid in the control flow
group, and then all of the (rid,∞) entries, again for each rid
in the control flow group. Note that M(rid) must be constant
for all rids in a control flow group because otherwise M is
wrong or else the control flow grouping is not valid, either of
which contradicts the executor being well-behaved.
S respects program order, by construction. S also in-
cludes all nodes from G. This follows because the
executor is well-behaved, implying that C includes
all requestIDs in the trace. Meanwhile, S includes
(rid, 0), (rid, 1), . . . , (rid, M(rid)), (rid,∞) for each of these
rids, and those are exactly the nodes of G. Thus, S is well-
formed.
Lemma 7 implies that OOOAudit(Tr, R, S) accepts.
Compare the executions in SSCO_AUDIT2(Tr, R) and
OOOAudit(Tr, R, S); the executions have the same logic, ex-
cept for three differences:
(i) ReExec2 has an explicit check about whether a request
issues fewer than M(rid) operations (Figure 12, line 51),
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whereas OOOExec has a separate opnum=∞ case (Fig-
ure 13, line 10).
(ii) ReExec2 executes a group from operation j− 1 to op-
eration j in SIMD-style (§3.1) whereas OOOExec round-
robins the execution from j− 1 to j, for a group of requests.
(iii) ReExec2 rejects if execution diverges.
Difference (i) was handled in the proof of Lemma 8: the
difference is superficial, in that both executions are requiring
a request rid to issue exactly M(rid) operations.
Difference (ii) does not result in different program state
across the two executions. This is because any implementa-
tion of SIMD-on-demand (for example, OROCHI’s acc-PHP;
§4.3) is supposed to ensure that the SIMD-style execution is
identical to executing each request in the group individually
(as is done in OOOAudit(Tr, R, S)), and so the results of all
instructions (including op values, etc.) are the same between
SSCO_AUDIT2(Tr, R) and OOOAudit(Tr, R, S).
For difference (iii), we have to argue that there is no
divergence across requests within a control flow group in
SSCO_AUDIT2(Tr, R). Assume otherwise. Say that the di-
vergence happens between (rid, j) and (rid, j + 1), for one
or more rids (in some control flow group), and consider
the execution of all requests in the group up to (rid, j) in
SSCO_AUDIT2(Tr, R). The program state produced by this
execution is equivalent to the program state at the same point
in S when executing OOOAudit(Tr, R, S), because that is the
whole point to the SIMD-style execution.
Consider now OOOAudit(Tr, R, S′), where S′ is a topologi-
cal sort of G (we know that a topological sort exists because
there are no cycles in G, and we know that there are no cycles
in G using the same reasoning as in Sub-lemma 7a). This exe-
cution results in the identical program state for each request
as OOOAudit(Tr, R, S), as argued in the proof of Lemma 5.
But by Sub-lemma 7b, OOOAudit(Tr, R, S′) reproduces the
original online execution. This implies that if execution di-
verges during SSCO_AUDIT2(Tr, R) for two requests in some
control flow grouping, then the two requests had different
executions during the original online execution. But if they
did and if the executor placed them in the same control flow
group, the executor is not well-behaved, in contradiction to
the premise.
A.7 Details of versioned storage
Key-value stores. Recall the requirement referenced in the
proof of Sub-lemma 6a: letting i∗ identify the key-value store
object and its operation log, invoking kv.get(k, s) must be
equivalent to creating a snapshot of a key-value store by
replaying the operations OLi∗ [1], . . . , OLi∗ [s− 1], and then
invoking “get(k)” on that snapshot.
To meet this requirement, OROCHI (§4) implements kv
as a map from keys to (seq,value) pairs. The invocation
kv.Build(OLi∗) (Figure 12, line 5) constructs this map from
all of the KvSet operations in OLi∗ . During re-execution,
kv.get(k, s) (Figure 12, line 25) performs a lookup on key k
to get a list of (seq,value) pairs, and then performs a search
to identify, of these pairs, the one with the highest seq less
than s (or false if there is no such pair); kv.get returns the
corresponding value.
Summarizing, kv.get(k, s) returns, of all of the entries in
OLi∗ , the KvSet to key k with highest sequence less than s.
Meanwhile, if one were to replay OLi[1], . . . , OLi[s− 1] to an
abstract key-value store and then issue a “get(k)”, one would
get the most recent write—which is the same as the highest
sequenced one in the set OLi[1], . . . , OLi[s − 1]. Thus, the
implementation matches the requirement.
Databases. Transactions create some complexity. On the one
hand, the pseudocode (Figures 12 and 13) and proofs treat
multiple SQL statements in a transaction as if they are a
single operation. On the other hand, in the implementation
(and in the model given at the outset; §A.1), code can execute
between the individual SQL statements of a transaction.
We briefly describe how to adapt the pseudocode and
proofs to the actual system. Our point of reference will be
Figure 12. As a bookkeeping detail, the system maintains
a per-query unique timestamp. This identifier is not in the
operation logs; it’s constructed by the verifier. When building
the versioned database (Figure 12, line 6), the verifier assigns
each query the timestamp ts = s · MAXQ + q, where s is the
enclosing transaction’s sequence number in the operation log,
MAXQ is the maximum queries allowed in one transaction
(10000 in our implementation), and q is the query number
within the transaction. Another detail is that, for the database
operation log, each entry’s opcontents field is structured as
an array of queries.
In the pseudocode, we alter lines 44–47 (in Figure 12).
For DBOps, CheckOp and SimOp need to happen in a loop,
interleaved with PHP execution. Instead of checking the en-
tire transaction at once, these functions check the individual
queries within the transaction. Specifically, using a query’s
timestamp, CheckOp and SimOp check whether each query
produced by program execution is the same as the corre-
sponding query in the operation log, and simulate the queries
against versioned storage.
The proofs can regard program state as proceeding deter-
ministically from query to query, in analogy with how the
proofs currently regard program state proceeding deterministi-
cally from op to op. This is valid because, per the concurrency
and atomic object model, there are no state operations inter-
leaved with the enclosing transaction (§4.4, §A.1).
For the system and the proofs to make sense, the versioned
database implementation has to meet the following require-
ment, which is analogous to that given for key-value stores
earlier. Let i∗ identify the database object and its operation
log.
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• For timestamp ts, let s = ⌊ts/MAXQ⌋ and let
q = ts mod MAXQ; for convenience, let queries =
OLi[s].opcontents.queries.
• The values returned by invoking db.do_query(sql, ts) must
be equivalent to:
— Creating a snapshot of a database by replaying the
transactions OLi∗ [1], . . . , OLi∗ [s− 1] followed by the
queries queries[1], . . . , queries[q− 1], and then
— Issuing the query sql.
To meet this requirement, OROCHI (§4) implements db atop
a traditional SQL database, in a manner similar to WARP [27].
Specifically, the database used for the application is aug-
mented with two columns: start_ts indicates when a given
row was updated to its current value, and end_ts indicates
when this row is updated to the next value. The invocation
db.Build(OLi∗) (Figure 12, line 6) inserts rows with the rel-
evant column values, using all of the queries in OLi∗ . Dur-
ing re-execution, db.do_query(sql, ts) obtains its results by
passing sql to the underlying storage, augmented with the
condition start_ts ≤ ts < end_ts.
One can show that this implementation meets the require-
ment above, but the details are tedious.
A.8 Efficiency of ProcessOpReports (time, space)
In this section, we analyze the time and space needed to
execute ProcessOpReports (Figure 5) and the space needed
to hold OpMap. Let X be the total number of requests, Y be
the total number of state operations, and Z be the cardinality
of the minimum set of edges needed to represent the <Tr
relation. Roughly speaking, the more concurrency there is,
the higher Z is. For intuition, if there are always P concurrent
requests, which arrive in X/P epochs (so all requests in an
epoch are concurrent with each other but succeed all of the
requests in the prior epoch), then Z ≈ X · P/2 (every two
adjacent epochs is a bipartite graph with all nodes on one side
connecting to all nodes on the other).
Lemma 11. The time and space complexity of
ProcessOpReports are both O(X + Y + Z). The space
complexity of OpMap is O(Y).
Proof. We begin with time complexity. The graph G is main-
tained as an adjacency list, so we assume that inserting a node
or edge is a constant-time operation. ProcessOpReports first
constructs R.M, at a cost of O(X); this is not depicted.
After that, ProcessOpReports comprises six pro-
cedures: CreateTimePrecedenceGraph, SplitNodes,
AddProgramEdges, CheckLogs, AddStateEdges, and
CycleDetect.
To analyze CreateTimePrecedenceGraph, notice that, when
handling a request’s arrival, the algorithm iterates over Fron-
tier, the number of iterations being equal to the number of
edges connecting this edge to its predecessors. Similarly,
when handling the request’s arrival, the algorithm iterates
over those same edges. So the total number of iterations has
the same order complexity as the number of edges added; this
is exactly Z, because CreateTimePrecedenceGraph adds the
optimal number of edges (shown in the next claim). This im-
plies that CreateTimePrecedenceGraph runs in time O(X+Z).
SplitNodes performs a linear pass over the nodes and edges
of GTr so runs in time O(X + Z).
AddProgramEdges and CheckLogs each perform at least
one iteration for each state operation and each request, so
these are both O(X + Y). AddStateEdges iterates over every
state operation in the logs, so it is O(Y).
The dominant cost is CycleDetect. This is done with a stan-
dard depth-first search [32, Ch. 22], which is O(V+E), where
V is the number of vertices and E is the number of edges in
the graph G. In our context, V = 2 ·X+Y , because each state
op has a vertex, and we have the (·, 0) and (·,∞) vertices for
each rid. To upper-bound E, let us analyze each vertex type.
The edges into (rid, 0) and out of (rid,∞) are “split” from
the original Z edges that CreateTimePrecedenceGraph added
to GTr; additionally, the out-edges from the (rid, 0) vertices
and the in-edges to the (rid,∞) vertices add an additional
2X edges total. An op vertex can have 4 edges at most: 2
in-edges and 2 out-edges, because in the worst case there
is one in-edge imposed by program order and one in-edge
imposed by log order, and likewise for out-edges. So an upper-
bound on the number of edges is 2 · X + 4 · Y + Z (which is
loose, as there cannot be more than Y “log” edges). Summing,
O(V + E) = O(X + Y + Z), as claimed.
Space complexity. The trace Tr and reports are O(X) and
O(Y), respectively; R.M is O(X). The space of the graph G
is proportional to the sum of vertices and edges, which as
established above is O(X + Y + Z). Finally, OpMap is O(Y)
because there is one entry for each state operation.
Lemma 12. CreateTimePrecedenceGraph adds the minimum
number of edges sufficient to capture the <Tr relation.
Proof. The argument is very similar to Theorem 5 in the full
version of Anderson et al. [14]; we rehearse it here.
Define the set of edges OPT as the minimum-sized set of
edges in GTr such that for all requests r1, r2: r1 <Tr r2 ⇐⇒
there is a directed path in OPT from r1 to r2. We want to
establish that the set of edges added by CreateTimePrece-
denceGraph, call it E, is a subset of OPT.
If not, then there is an edge e ∈ E but e /∈ OPT; label the
vertices of e as r1 and r2. Because e ∈ E, Lemma 2 implies
that r1 <Tr r2. But this implies, by definition of OPT, that
there is a directed path from r1 to r2 in OPT. Yet, e /∈ OPT,
which implies that there is at least one other request r3 such
that there are directed paths in OPT from r1 to r3 and from r3
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to r2. This in turn means, again by definition of OPT, that
r1 <Tr r3 <Tr r2.
However, if this is the case, then r3 would have evicted r1 (or
an intermediate request) from the frontier by the time that r2
arrived. Which implies that r2 could not have been connected
to r1 in E. This is a contradiction.
We established that E, which captures the relation <Tr (per
Lemma 2), is a subset of OPT. Yet, OPT is the smallest set of
edges needed to capture the relation. Therefore, E and OPT
are equal.
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